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SUBSTANCE OVERLOAD: A COMPARATIVE 
EXAMINATION OF JAPANESE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE LAW THROUGH THE LENS OF THE 
DAIWA BANK CASE 
 
A. Reid Monroe-Sheridan † 
 
Abstract:  Japanese corporate governance law is facing a period of remarkable 
change.  In light of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s push for corporate governance reforms 
and the explosive news of Olympus Corporation’s $1.7 billion accounting scandal in 
2011, academics and practitioners alike are devoting renewed attention to the rules that 
govern Japan’s boardrooms.  This increased focus brings to the fore two key questions 
about Japan’s modern corporate governance principles: how have they evolved and how 
are they applied in practice?  To answer these questions, this article revisits the Daiwa 
Bank case, one of Japan’s most stunning business scandals.  This international criminal 
conspiracy resulted in one of the world’s largest banks being banned from operating in 
the United States and gave rise to a seminal Japanese judicial opinion that found a single 
bank director personally liable to his employer for over $500 million.  By examining the 
law and legacy of the Daiwa Bank scandal and subsequent developments in Japanese 
statutory and case law, both on their own terms and in light of their analogues in 
Delaware, this article seeks to shed light on and critically evaluate the evolution and 
application of certain major Japanese corporate governance principles. 
                                                
† Registered Foreign Attorney in Japan (New York-licensed), Monroe-Sheridan Foreign Law 
Office; Adjunct Lecturer, University of Tokyo Law School.  Research in connection with this article was 
greatly aided by my time as a student and later as an adjunct lecturer at the University of Tokyo Law 
School, opportunities made possible by Professors Minoru Nakazato and J. Mark Ramseyer, to whom I am 
immensely grateful.  I am also deeply grateful to the late Professor Yoshiaki Miyasako of the University of 
Tokyo Law School for the materials and commentary on the Daiwa Bank case that he provided as part of 
his Law of Business Management class.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Recently, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been locked in a 
battle with Japan’s powerful business interests over key corporate 
governance reforms, including measures to increase the participation of 
outside directors on the boards of public companies.1  After an arduous fight, 
the Japanese Diet passed certain reforms in June of 2014, with 
implementation to take place within eighteen months.2  In part a response to 
the explosive news of Olympus Corporation’s $1.7 billion accounting 
scandal in 2011,3 Prime Minister Abe’s insistence on corporate governance 
reforms as a critical component of his package of economic policies4 has 
brought renewed attention to corporate governance from Japanese law firm 
practitioners and in-house legal departments alike.5  Recent rulings by the 
Supreme Court of Japan6 and the Fukuoka High Court7 have added fuel to 
the fire, with the Fukuoka High Court in particular appearing to expand the 
scope of corporate directors’ fiduciary duty of oversight beyond what many 
had anticipated.8   
 With corporate governance in the spotlight and significant reforms 
coming into effect in short order, the origin and practical effect of the 
                                                
1  See Kaishahō No Iichibu Wo Kaisei Suru Hōritsuan Nado No Kokkaiteishutsu To Gaiyō [The 
Proposal of the Bill to Amend a Portion of the Company Law and a Summary Thereof], 2017 SHŌJI HŌMU 
4, 5 (Dec. 1, 2013); Ritsuko Ando, Japan PM to Urge Company Boards to Open Up in Governance Push 
as Resolve Tested, REUTERS (May 14, 2014), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/14/uk-japan-
governance-shareholders-idUKKBN0DU1Z820140514. 
2  Kaishahō No Ichibu Wo Kaisei Suru Hōritsuan [The Bill to Amend a Portion of the Company 
Law], Law No. 90 of 2014 (Japan), available at http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/minji07_00151.html (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2014). 
3  Hiroko Tabuchi, Arrests in Olympus Scandal Point to Widening Inquiry into a Cover-Up, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2012, at B3. 
4  Corporate Governance in Japan: A Revolution in the Making, THE ECONOMIST (May 3, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21601557-long-last-japanese-firms-seem-be-coming-under-
proper-outside-scrutiny-revolution. 
5  See, e.g., Mitsuru Chino, Gurōbaru Jidai No Kigyōnai Hōmubu Ni Okeru Yakuwari To Kadai [The 
Role of, and Issues Facing, Internal Corporate Legal Departments in the Global Age], 2025 SHŌJI HŌMU 
26, 28–32 (Feb. 25, 2014) (discussing the important role of internal corporate legal departments in 
facilitating sound corporate governance and compliance); Kaishahō Kaiseihōan To Shagaitorishimariyaku 
Ni Kakaru Jitsumutaiō [Practical Responses to the Bill to Amend the Company Law and Outside 
Directorships], 2023 SHŌJI HŌMU 35 (Feb. 5, 2014). 
6  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 15, 2010, 2091 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 90, 93 (Japan) (suggesting 
that the Supreme Court of Japan has adopted dual substantive and procedural inquiries in applying the 
business judgment rule; this is addressed in more detail in Part III.D of this article). 
7  Kōtō Saibansho [Fukuoka High Ct.] Apr. 13, 2012, 1399 KIN’YŪ SHŌJI HANREI [KINYŪ HANREI] 
24 (Japan) (affirming a Fukuoka District Court decision that appears to expand directors’ fiduciary duty of 
oversight to include oversight of wholly owned subsidiaries; this is addressed in more detail in Part III.B.3 
of this article). 
8  Yasushi Ito, Fukuoka Uoichiba Kabunushi Daihyō Soshō Jiken No Kento [An Examination of the 
Fukuoka Fish Market Shareholder Derivative Suit], 2034 SHŌJI HŌMU 4, 14 (June 6, 2014). 
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existing rules (and, by extension, their influence going forward in light of 
these reforms) is ripe for examination.  How do Japanese courts apply these 
legal concepts and what is their practical effect?  Although Japanese courts 
have provided the business and legal communities with relatively limited 
corporate governance case law, there is one particularly instructive 
decision—a decision with remarkable origins—that serves as an excellent 
starting point for this inquiry.  
 Emerging from one of Japan’s most dramatic corporate governance 
scandals, the Daiwa Bank Case9, 10 (or “Daiwa” when so indicated by the 
context) is a seminal and groundbreaking legal opinion that continues to 
exert remarkable influence on the governance of some of the world’s largest 
corporations.11  A corporate law decision from the Osaka District Court, this 
case touched on a variety of crucial corporate governance issues that had 
been largely unexplored by Japanese courts at the time the opinion was 
published.  With a sprawling and at times muddled analysis of the bank’s 
shocking international criminal conspiracy and its implications for corporate 
shareholders, the Osaka District Court put forth an influential statement of 
several key principles of Japanese corporate law.  The decision also 
provided a far-reaching and occasionally unsettling illustration of how 
Japanese courts may seek to apply those principles to the actions of 
corporate managers.  
This article focuses on a selection of these important corporate 
governance principles that are influential in Japan today and either 
originated in or were significantly shaped by the Daiwa Bank Case.  
Revisiting this turning point in the evolution of these legal concepts provides 
an opportunity to examine the jurisprudential logic and circumstances that 
helped form several core tenets of corporate governance in the world’s third-
largest economy.  This article will also compare certain portions of the 
Daiwa Bank Case to key Delaware case law,12 allowing a more thorough 
                                                
9  Chihō Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.], Sept. 20, 2000, 1721 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 30, 36 (Japan) 
[hereinafter “Daiwa Bank Case”]. 
10  Japanese judicial opinions typically use certain stock pseudonyms for the parties involved and are 
cited without reference to the party names.  This article follows those conventions.   
11  For example, Toyota, Softbank and Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, all Japanese companies, 
have market capitalizations exceeding ¥8,000,000,000,000 (roughly $80 billion).  Toyota’s market 
capitalization was in excess of $200 billion as of this writing.  Jika Sōgaku Rankingu [Market 
Capitalization Ranking], NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, INC. http://www.nikkei.com/markets/ranking/stock/cap 
high.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2014). 
12 Due to the large number of major corporations incorporated in Delaware and the media and 
academic attention devoted to Delaware corporate law decisions, the state plays a uniquely important role 
in U.S. corporate governance jurisprudence.  See, e.g., STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN THEORY 121-22 (2008) (The role Delaware plays in business judgment jurisprudence is 
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critique of not only the Daiwa court’s reasoning and conclusions, but also 
the current state of several major Japanese corporate governance principles.   
Part II of this article examines the factual background of the Daiwa 
Bank Case. Part III provides analysis of the case and subsequent legal 
developments in Japan along with a comparison to Delaware law.  
Specifically, Part III covers five major issues raised by the Daiwa Bank 
Case: (1) the duty of directors to establish an internal control system, (2) the 
scope and application of the business judgment rule, (3) limitations on 
director liability enacted after the Daiwa Bank Case, (4) the causal 
relationship necessary for a finding of director liability, and (5) the 
acceptance of plea bargains as evidence of corporate criminality.  Part IV 
concludes.  
 
II. THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF THE DAIWA BANK SCANDAL 
 
 On November 2, 1995, U.S. bank regulators ordered The Daiwa Bank, 
Ltd. (“Daiwa” or “Daiwa Bank”) to close its operations in the United States 
within three months, and a federal grand jury indicted Daiwa on twenty-four 
criminal charges in connection with the bank’s concealment of $1.1 billion 
in trading losses. 13   Daiwa was charged with, among other crimes, 
conspiracy, mail and wire fraud, obstructing an examination of a financial 
institution, falsification of bank records and failure to disclose federal 
crimes.14  Masahiro Tsuda, formerly the general manager of Daiwa’s New 
York branch, was indicted for conspiring to deceive regulators.15  Daiwa 
faced fines under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines of over $1.3 billion,16 
and eventually entered into a plea agreement under which it paid $340 
million, at the time “the largest criminal fine levied on a financial institution 
in U.S. history.”17 
After shouldering the enormous fine, staggering trading losses, and 
$10 million in related attorneys’ fees—all underscored by a plea bargain 
admitting executive malfeasance at the bank—Daiwa soon found itself 
                                                                                                                                            
“pervasive” and Delaware chancellors “sit at ‘the center of the corporate law universe.’”) (quoting D. 
Gordon Smith, Chancellor Allen and the Fundamental Question, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 577, 578 (1998)). 
13 Peter Truell, A Japanese Bank is Indicted in U.S. and also Barred, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 1995), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/03/business/a-japanese-bank-is-indicted-in-us-and-also-barred.html. 
14 See Criminal Complaint & Indictment Against Daiwa Bank, THE LECTRIC LAW LIBRARY, 
(Nov. 2, 1995), http://www.lectlaw.com/files/cas60.htm. 
15 Truell, supra note 13. 
16 Id.; Press Release Announcing Criminal Indictment of Daiwa Bank, THE LECTRIC LAW LIBRARY, 
(Nov. 2, 1995), http://www.lectlaw.com/files/cur45.htm. 
17  Bruce Aronson, Reconsidering the Importance of Law in Japanese Corporate Governance: 
Evidence from the Daiwa Bank Shareholder Derivative Case, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 11, 20 (2003). 
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facing shareholder derivative suits in Japan.18  These suits were consolidated 
before the Osaka District Court, which handed down a lengthy ruling against 
a number of Daiwa’s directors on September 20, 2000.19   
Ultimately, the Daiwa Bank Case brought to the fore many novel and 
underdeveloped issues of Japanese corporate law, including most saliently 
the fiduciary duty of directors to establish an internal control system, the 
scope of the business judgment rule, and the scope and causational 
grounding of corporate director liability.  However, to fully appreciate the 
court’s treatment of these issues, it is necessary to first understand the 
extraordinary facts underlying the Daiwa Bank decision—how did the 
nineteenth largest bank in the world find itself banned from the United 
States and subject to such colossal fines?20 
 
A. The Factual Background of the Daiwa Bank Case 
 
 The origins of the scandal date back to February of 1984, when Daiwa 
gave its New York branch permission to trade U.S. Treasury bonds within a 
$3 million limit.21  Toshihide Iguchi,22 who at the time managed securities 
and custodial services in the New York branch, was put in charge of the 
trading.23  Iguchi was a fairly successful trader until June of that year, when 
he lost approximately $200,000 in a single trade.24  Rather than report the 
loss, Iguchi decided that he would recoup the loss through off-the-books25 
trading of Treasuries.26  Unfortunately for Iguchi, this off-the-books trading 
only led to further losses, which he then tried to recoup through even more 
off-the-books trading.27  One can guess what happened next.  Eleven years 
later, Iguchi was sitting on $1.1 billion of off-the-books trading losses.28 
                                                
18  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 9 (the fees were paid to the law firms Debevoise & 
Plimpton and Morivillo, Abramowitz, Grand, Iason & Silberberg). 
19  Id. at 7. 
20  Truell, supra note 13. 
21  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 8. 
22  As is common in Japanese judicial opinions, the Osaka District Court refers to Iguchi by a 
pseudonym.  See id.  Iguchi grew up in Japan and moved to the United States when he was 20.  He 
graduated from Southwest Missouri State University in 1975 and worked first at a car dealership before 
joining Daiwa’s depositary department in 1976.  An Unusual Path to Big-Time Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
27, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/27/business/an-unusual-path-to-big-time-trading.html. 
23  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 8. 
24  Id. 
25  In other words, Iguchi was buying and selling Treasury bonds without properly recording the 
purchases and sales as required in the books and records of Daiwa’s New York office.  Criminal Complaint 
& Indictment Against Daiwa Bank, supra note 14. 
26  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 8. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
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 Iguchi benefitted from loose oversight and an institutional position 
that allowed him to falsify trading records and have trade confirmations sent 
directly to him rather than to Daiwa’s New York branch back office.29  He 
also made unauthorized sales of customers’ Treasury bonds, held in custody 
by Daiwa, in order to conceal the losses generated by his own trading.30  The 
counterparties with whom Iguchi traded were apparently content to let his 
unusual market activity pass without asking questions.  The New York 
branch under Iguchi, according to one Lehman Brothers trader, was a “hot, 
hot account and was handled with kid gloves.”31  Traders at another firm 
noted the size of Iguchi’s trades and took to calling him “Big Foot.”32 
 On July 18, 1995, 33  Iguchi sent a thirty-page confession to the 
president of Daiwa.34  Daiwa’s president did not immediately report these 
losses.  Instead, according to the Daiwa opinion, the president formulated a 
plan under which he would enlist Iguchi’s help in determining the full scope 
of the losses, keep a tight lid on the scandal, and disclose the loss promptly 
to the Japanese Ministry of Finance but not to U.S. authorities.35  Under the 
plan, Daiwa would address the loss in September of 1995, when it would 
write off the losses all at once in its midterm settlement of accounts.36   
 Unfortunately for Daiwa, avoiding disclosure to the U.S. authorities 
necessitated the forgery of numerous custodial receipts and transfer notes as 
well as the filing of a fraudulent call report37 with the Federal Reserve Board 
(“F.R.B.”).38  Certain senior managers at Daiwa instructed Iguchi to continue 
                                                
29  Shinsaku Iwahara, Daiwa Ginkō Daihyō Soshō Jiken Isshin Hanketsu To Daihyō Soshō Seido 
Kaisei Mondai (Jō) [The Daiwa Bank Derivative Suit Trial Court Opinion and Issues of Reform of the 
Derivative Suit System (Part I)], 1576 SHŌJI HŌMU 4, 5 (Nov. 5, 2000); Mitsuru Misawa, Daiwa Bank 
Scandal in New York: Its Causes, Significance, and Lessons in the International Society, 29 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1023, 1027-28 (1996); see also The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 10-11. 
30  Shinsaku Iwahara, supra note 29, at 5. 
31  Saul Hansell, Futures Trades Could Explain Daiwa Mystery, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 1995), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/05/business/futures-trades-could-explain-daiwa-mystery.html. 
32  An Unusual Path to Big-Time Trading, supra note 22. 
33  Daiwa’s president received the letter on July 24, 1995.  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 9, 
40. 
34  Truell, supra note 13; Sheryl WuDunn, Japanese Delayed Letting U.S. Know of Big Bank Loss, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 1995), http://www.nytimes. com/1995/10/10/us/japanese-delayed-letting-us-know-of-
big-bank-loss.html. 
35  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 40. 
36  Id. 
37  Report of Assets and Liabilities of U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks, BOARD OF  
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/relea
ses/assetliab/current.htm. 
38  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 40; Criminal Complaint & Indictment Against Daiwa 
Bank, supra note 14 (this complaint alleges that Daiwa falsely claimed that it held $600 million in Treasury 
bills that it had in fact already sold); Peter Truell, Court Papers Link 2 Daiwa Executives With Errant 
Trader, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/20/business/international-business-
court-papers-link-2-daiwa-executives-with-errant-trader.html. 
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his off-the-books trading for the time being in order to cover interest 
payments on the securities he had already sold without authorization.39  The 
Ministry of Finance, meanwhile, reportedly “demanded that Daiwa Bank 
maintain tight control over information regarding the incident and hurry to 
elucidate the situation” and told Daiwa that this was the “worst possible time 
to disclose the unauthorized trades and sales” publicly.40, 41  Japan “had just 
experienced its first bank run in decades,” and the Ministry was no doubt 
motivated by increasing global scrutiny of the Japanese financial sector.42 
 Beginning in 1992, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York had on 
several occasions voiced its concerns to Daiwa executives that oversight and 
internal controls in their New York branch were inadequate.43  By 1993, the 
president of the F.R.B. had expressed suspicions about Iguchi’s trading 
specifically but received assurances from Daiwa’s management that the 
trading would be stopped and oversight in the New York branch 
strengthened.44   
Daiwa finally disclosed the full extent of its losses to the F.R.B. in 
mid-September of 1995.45  It took less than a month and a half for the United 
States Attorney’s Office to persuade a grand jury to indict the bank.46  The 
bank then held a board meeting in February of 1996 at which the board of 
directors voted unanimously to enter into a plea agreement.47  Ultimately, 
Daiwa pleaded guilty to sixteen of the twenty-four criminal charges and paid 
a $340 million fine.48  Iguchi agreed to a plea bargain under which he was 
sentenced to four years in prison and fined $2 million, and Tsuda, the former 
manager of the New York branch, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two 
months in prison and fined $100,000.49 
 
                                                
39  Criminal Complaint & Indictment Against Daiwa Bank, supra note 14; Sheryl WuDunn, Daiwa 
Concedes It Told Trader To Keep Dealing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/ 
21/business/international-business-daiwa-concedes-it-told-trader-to-keep-dealing.html. 
40  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 41. 
41  All quotations cited to Japanese sources are this author’s own translations unless otherwise noted. 
42  Sheryl WuDunn, Daiwa Affair Turns Up Heat on Japan's Finance Ministry, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 
1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/26/business/daiwa-affair-turns-up-heat-on-japan-s-finance-
ministry.html. 
43  Peter Truell, Fed Missed Big Opportunity on Daiwa, Ex-Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 
1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/19/business/international-business-fed-missed-big-opportunity-
on-daiwa-ex-officials-say.html. 
44  Id. 
45  Criminal Complaint & Indictment Against Daiwa Bank, supra note 14. 
46  Truell, supra note 13; Criminal Complaint & Indictment Against Daiwa Bank, supra note 14. 
47  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 9. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. at 9-10. 
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B. Revenge of the Shareholders: Derivative Suits Filed in Japan 
 
 The fallout from the scandal was hardly confined to the United States.  
Across the Pacific, Japanese shareholders of Daiwa filed two derivative suits 
against current and former directors of the bank.  In the first suit (the “First 
Case”),50 the shareholders alleged that the directors had breached their 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the company by failing to establish an 
adequate internal control system.51  In the second suit (the “Second Case”), 
they alleged that the directors had breached their duties of care and loyalty 
by violating the laws of the United States while doing business there, or by 
failing to prevent such violations.52  Plaintiffs in the First Case sought $1.1 
billion in damages (the total loss from Iguchi’s trades) from the directors, 
and plaintiffs in the Second Case sought $350 million in damages (the $340 
million fine Daiwa paid under its plea bargain plus the $10 million in 
lawyers’ fees Daiwa incurred in connection with the criminal suit).53  The 
two cases were consolidated before the Osaka District Court, which 
ultimately handed down a judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor.  The court found 
that different directors in both the First Case and the Second Case had 
breached their fiduciary duties to Daiwa and consequently owed a total of 
$775 million in damages, with one director in particular personally liable to 
Daiwa for $530 million.54 
 The opinion sent shockwaves rippling through the Japanese business 
and legal communities and quickly established itself as one of the most 
important corporate governance decisions in Japan due to several factors:  
the case involved an extraordinary set of facts, one of Japan’s powerful 
financial institutions, eye-popping liability, and a number of important legal 
questions that had been seldom addressed (or were unaddressed entirely) by 
Japanese courts.55  The Daiwa Bank Case also helped trigger Japanese 
corporate law reforms such as limitations on directors’ liability for harm to 
                                                
50  This nomenclature is originally Professor Bruce Aronson’s.  See Aronson, supra note 17, at 26. 
51  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 7-8. 
52  Id. at 12. 
53  See id. at 7. 
54  See id. (amounts have been approximately converted from Japanese yen into U.S. dollars for 
convenience). 
55 The most significant of these issues are: (1) to what extent directors are obligated to create an 
internal control system, (2) whether the duty of directors to obey the law applies to the laws of foreign 
countries, (3) whether directors stationed in the company headquarters are responsible for monitoring 
employees in foreign offices, and (4) to what extent directors can be held liable for corporate losses.  See 
id. at 5 (HANREI JIHŌ’s introduction to the Daiwa Bank Case). 
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their employer-corporation.56  Bruce Aronson has noted the similarities 
between the Daiwa Bank Case and the watershed Delaware cases Van 
Gorkom57 and Caremark.58  These three cases all surprised many in the 
relevant business and legal communities, involved remarkable amounts of 
potential liability, and sparked discussion of significant reforms.59  Although 
the Daiwa Bank plaintiffs settled the case after the Osaka District Court 
ruling60—thus precluding input on the Daiwa opinion from a higher court in 
Japan—its impact has extended far beyond mere persuasive influence on 
subsequent case law.  Indeed, the Daiwa Bank Case continues to be cited 
today in Japanese corporate law discussions of a director’s duty to establish 
an internal control system, 61  an area of increasing importance for 
international corporate law practitioners in Japan.62  
Despite the Daiwa Bank Case’s important role in Japanese corporate 
law and the considerable attention the scandal received from the Japanese 
and American press, American legal scholars have written little about the 
Daiwa Bank Case, its legacy, and what it reveals about Japanese corporate 
law.63  The lack of attention from American legal scholars is surprising in 
light of the fact that Japan is the United States’ fourth largest trading partner 
and commands over $100 billion of foreign direct investment annually from 
                                                
56  See Kigyō Tōchi Ni Kansuru Shōhō Kaiseihō No Jitsumu No Eikyō [The Practical Effects of the 
Commercial Code Reform on Corporate Governance], 1617 SHŌJI HŌMU 8, 12, 17 (2002) (roundtable 
discussion with Eimei Kubori, Hideki Kanda, and Yoshiaki Miyasako). 
57  See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
58 See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
59  See Aronson, supra note 17, at 12-13. 
60  See id. at 26. 
61  See, e.g., Motokazu Endō, Kansa Ni Okeru Fuesei Risuku Taiō Kijun Ga Torishimariyaku Ni 
Oyoboshieru Eikyou (Jō) [The Potential Effect of Risk Management Auditing Standards on Corporate 
Directors (Part I)], 2024 SHŌJI HŌMU 22, 24 (2014) (citing the Daiwa Bank Case in explaining the 
premises on which the duty to establish an internal control system is based). 
62  Marubeni and Bridgestone are two examples of major Japanese corporations that have recently 
found themselves on the wrong side of U.S. anti-bribery enforcement.  See infra Part III.D.3.  High-profile 
cases like these are a likely contributor to additional practitioner focus on this area.  See, e.g., Mitsuru 
Chino, supra note 5, at 28 (addressing the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other bribery regulations 
as the second major topic after antitrust law). 
63  Bruce Aronson is the only legal scholar with a U.S. Juris Doctor who has published articles 
focusing chiefly on the Daiwa opinion.  He has published two articles about the case.  See generally 
Aronson, supra note 17; Bruce Aronson, Learning from Comparative Law in Teaching U.S. Corporate 
Law: Director’s Liability in Japan and the U.S., 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 213 (2003).  Mitsuru Misawa, 
who holds an LL.M. from Harvard Law School but received his LL.B. from the University of Tokyo, has 
also written about The Daiwa Bank Case in English.  See generally Mitsuru Misawa, supra note 29; 
Mitsuru Misawa, A Comparative Study of US and Japanese Directors’ Duty of Disclosure, 123 BANKING 
L.J. 39 (2006); Mitsuru Misawa, Bank Directors’ Decisions on Bad Loans: A Comparative Study of U.S. 
and Japanese Standards of Required Care, 122 BANKING L. J. 429 (2005); Mitsuru Misawa, Shareholders’ 
Action and Director’s Responsibility in Japan, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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the United States, giving Japanese corporate behavior the potential to 
significantly impact U.S. businesses and the U.S. economy.64 
 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DAIWA BANK CASE AND RELATED CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE LAW 
 
A. An Introduction to Fiduciary Duties in Japan 
 
1.  The Duties of Care and Loyalty 
 
 The plaintiffs’ claims in the Daiwa Bank Case were rooted in 
allegations that the directors breached their fiduciary duties to the bank.  
Although the fiduciary duties of directors in Japan are similar to their 
Delaware equivalents, they are not identical, and some background on 
Japanese fiduciary duties is helpful in understanding the Daiwa opinion. 
  As under Delaware law, the fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care 
for corporate directors in Japan find their theoretical grounding in the 
position of corporate directors and executives as delegees of authority 
ultimately resting with the shareholders who own the corporation.65  Civil 
Code Article 644 provides that delegees owe a duty to “fulfill delegated 
obligations with the due care of a good manager.”66  In Japan, and in the 
Daiwa Bank Case specifically, the duty of care is referred to as the “duty of 
care as a good manager” (zenkanchūigimu).67  Furthermore, the obligations 
that spring from the duty of care vary according to the business type, scale, 
scope, and complexity of the relevant company.68  Company Law Article. 
355 codifies the duty of loyalty, providing that “directors must obey the 
laws, the articles of incorporation, and the decisions made at shareholder 
meetings, and must execute those duties with loyalty to the joint-stock 
corporation.”69  Structurally, some Japanese legal scholars consider the duty 
of loyalty to be a subordinate and necessary element of the duty of care, such 
                                                
64  Japan, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.ustr.gov/countries-
regions/japan-korea-apec/japan (citing the trade figure for 2013 and the foreign direct investment figure for 
2012, each being the latest year from which data was available at the time of this writing). 
65  Takurō Yamaguchi, Torishimariyaku No Zenkanchūigimu Chūjitsugimu: Keiei Handan No 
Gensoku Nado (Jō) [Directors’ Duties of Care and Loyalty: The Business Judgment Rule, Etc. (Part I)], 
1837 SHŌJI HŌMU 32, 32 (2008) (citing Kaishahō [Kaishahō] [Company Law], Law No. 109 of 2006, art. 
330 (Japan). 
66  MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.] art. 644 (Japan). 
67  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 35.  
68  Takurō Yamaguchi, supra note 65, at 32. 
69  Kaishahō [Kaishahō] [Company Law], Law No. 109 of 2006, art. 355.  See also Takurō 
Yamaguchi, supra note 65, at 32.  
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that any violation of the duty of loyalty automatically results in a violation of 
the duty of care.70 
When a director, auditor, accountant, or executive breaches his or her 
fiduciary duties resulting in a loss to the company, he or she is liable to the 
company for that loss under Company Law Article 423.71  In a case of 
alleged director negligence, a finding of director liability requires the 
following four elements: (1) the director was negligent, (2) the company 
suffered damages, (3) there was a causal relationship between the director’s 
negligence and the damages suffered, and (4) there is cause to fault the 
director for the negligence.72  To enforce the director’s liability to the 
corporation, a shareholder may bring a derivative suit on behalf of the 
corporation under Company Law Article 847.  This allows shareholders who 
have held stock in the company for six months or more to exercise this right 
by executing a demand on the company to pursue the lawsuit.73  Article 847 
further provides that if the company fails to pursue the action within sixty 
days, the shareholder may commence the derivative suit independently.74 
 
2. The Duty to Establish an Internal Control System 
 
In Japan, it is now recognized that a director has a duty to monitor her 
corporate employer as well as establish and maintain an internal control 
                                                
70  See, e.g., Takurō Yamaguchi, supra note 65, at 32. This issue is not fully settled.  For example, in 
a 2013 opinion, the Osaka District Court explained that directors are obligated to establish an internal 
control system as part of their duty of care and then concluded without elucidation that a failure to establish 
an adequate internal control system is a violation of the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.  Osaka Chihō 
Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] Dec. 26, 2013, 1435 Kinyū Shōji Hanrei [Kinyū Hanrei] 42, 61 (Japan). 
In partial contrast to Japanese law, Delaware law generally defines the duty of care and the duty of 
loyalty as discrete fiduciary obligations, although Delaware courts concede some overlap.  See, e.g., Chen 
v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 692 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“It is not clear at this stage whether the disclosure 
violations in the Proxy Statement resulted from a breach of the duty of loyalty or the duty of care.”); TVI 
Corp. v. Gallagher, C.A. No. 7798–VCP, 2013 WL 5809271, at *13 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[T]he core of 
Plaintiffs’ allegations are that the Defendants made decisions that were self-interested and motivated by 
bad faith.  Such claims, however, invoke the duty of loyalty, not the duty of care.”) (emphasis added).  But 
see In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746 n.402 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“The phrasing 
is natural because, at its core, the duty of loyalty is just a bet that some situations are likely to lead to 
careless or imprudent transactions for the corporation, which is to say that the duty of care is a motivating 
concern for the duty of loyalty.  Here again the duties overlap.”) (quoting Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith 
Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 Duke L. J. 1, 43 (2005)).  
71  Kaishahō [Kaishahō ] [Company Law], Law No. 109 of 2006, art. 423, para. 1 (Japan).  See also 
Takurō Yamaguchi, supra note 65, at 34. 
72  Takurō Yamaguchi, supra note 65, at 34.  It is, admittedly, difficult to imagine a situation where a 
finding of negligence is appropriate but where there is not “cause to fault” the director for negligence.  
73  Id.; Kaishahō [Kaishahō ] [Company Law], Law No. 109 of 2006, art. 423, para. 1 (Japan). 
74  Kaishahō [Kaishahō ] [Company Law], Law No. 109 of 2006, art. 423, para. 3 (Japan). 
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system.75  However, it is still not fully settled how exactly the business 
judgment rule applies to the standards established by the internal control 
system and to what extent directors enjoy a right of reliance in ensuring the 
efficacy of the system.76  During the time period when Iguchi was making 
unauthorized trades at Daiwa, legal scholars in Japan already recognized that 
directors owe a duty to monitor, but the legal basis for the duty was still the 
subject of debate at that point.77 
 
3.  The Business Judgment Rule 
 
As in Delaware, the business judgment rule in Japan applies to 
directors’ business decisions in their capacity as corporate managers, 
offering protection against a claim that a director violated her fiduciary 
duties.  The rule “provides that corporate officers should be afforded wide 
discretion in their business judgments” and will not breach their duties of 
care or loyalty “absent decisions that are unreasonable under the 
circumstances and at the time they were made.”78  One legal scholar’s 
formulation of the Japanese rule, which appears to be generally consistent 
with the Osaka District Court’s application in Daiwa, is that the rule limits a 
court’s inquiry to:  (1) whether the director was erroneously inattentive with 
regard to the facts upon which the director based her business decision, and 
(2) whether the director’s choice of behavior based on those facts was 
“extremely unreasonable” (ichijirushiku fugōri).79  This formulation is, at 
least in theory, designed to allow directors to approach business decisions 
aggressively, a claim that this article will address in Part III.D.1.80  A 
knowing violation of law does not fall within the scope of business decisions 
protected by the business judgment rule, although the bounds of this 
exception were still in debate at the time Daiwa was decided.81 
                                                
75  KENJIRŌ EGASHIRA, KABUSHIKIGAISHAHŌ [THE LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS] 371 (2d ed. 
2008). 
76  For a recent example of the ongoing debate about the scope of the duty to monitor and the court’s 
deference, or lack thereof, to directors’ business judgments and reliance on others, see Yasushi Ito, supra 
note 8, at 12–15.  
77  KAZUTERU KAMI, TORISHIMARIYAKU NO KENGEN TO SEKININ [THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
OF DIRECTORS] 70 (Chuō Keizaisha ed., 1994). 
78  Hatsuru Morita, Wagakoku Ni Keieihandan Gensoku Wa Sonzai Shite Ita No Ka [Did the Business 
Judgment Rule Ever Exist in Japan?], 1858 SHŌJI HŌMU 4, 4 (2009).  
79  Takurō Yamaguchi, supra note 65, at 40 n.9 (alternatively formulated as “obviously 
unreasonable” (akiraka ni fugōri)). 
80  Id. at 35. 
81  Id. at 36 (citing Kazushi Yoshihara, Torishimariyaku No Keiei Handan To Kabunushi Daihyō 
Soshō [Shareholder Representative Suits and the Business Judgment Rule for Directors], in KABUNUSHI 
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 Additionally, at the time of the Daiwa verdict, Commercial Code 
Article 26682 required that directors obey the “laws and regulations” (hōrei) 
as part of their duty of care, an obligation which the Daiwa Court used as a 
basis for stripping business judgment protection 83  and finding director 
liability. 84   However, it was an open question whether “laws and 
regulations” included the laws and regulations of foreign countries in 
addition to those of Japan.85  At the time—and afterwards—there was 
considerable debate about whether a duty to obey the laws of foreign 
countries is in fact a component obligation of the duty of loyalty.86 
 
B. The Duty to Establish an Internal Control System 
 
1. The Daiwa Court’s Ruling on the Duty of Directors to Establish an 
Internal Control System 
 
 At least as important as any other aspect of the Daiwa opinion is that 
Daiwa was the first case to find directors liable for a failure to institute an 
effective internal control system to monitor legal compliance. 87   The 
plaintiffs alleged that although Daiwa had implemented some internal 
controls in its New York office, the system suffered from such egregious 
deficiencies that the directors’ failure to improve it amounted to a breach of 
the directors’ fiduciary duties.88  The defendant directors, for their part, 
alleged that the system in place went above and beyond the industry 
standard at the time and that it was ineffective only because the measures 
Iguchi took to conceal his losses were exceptionally devious.89  The directors 
further claimed that “[e]stablishing an internal control system that can 
withstand even an unusually clever scheme to conceal improper activity is 
                                                                                                                                            
DAIHYŌ SOSHŌ TAIKEI [A SURVEY OF SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUITS] 52 (Mitsuo Kondō ed., 1996); see 
also the Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 5.  
82  SHŌHŌ (COMM. C.) art. 266, para. 1, no. 5 (Japan) (repealed 2005).  It has since been replaced by 
Company Law Article 355. 
83  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 41-42.  
84  Shinsaku Iwahara, supra note 29, at 11; see also the Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 32-33. 
85  Shinsaku Iwahara, supra note 29, at 4 n.1. 
86  See, e.g., The Practical Effects of the Commercial Code Reform on Corporate Governance, supra 
note 56, at 19 (Professors Kanda and Miyasako discuss the problematic nature of defining the scope of 
Commercial Code art. 266 to include foreign laws, with Professor Miyasako noting that even after the 
Daiwa Bank Case, he interprets the conventional wisdom to be that art. 266 refers only to domestic laws). 
This debate seems to have subsided.  See, e.g., KENJIRŌ EGASHIRA, supra note 75, at 427 (simply stating 
that directors must obey “all the laws” including laws for the public benefit). 
87  Shinsaku Iwahara, supra note 29, at 11 (noting that the Daiwa Bank Case was a “watershed” 
(kakkiteki) opinion with regard to the duty to implement an internal control system). 
88  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 10-12. 
89  Id. at 12-13. 
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beyond the scope of the duty of care required by law of directors and 
auditors.”90 
Ultimately, the court held that directors did indeed have a duty to 
establish an internal control system:  
 
[The] internal control system must accurately assess, for 
example, credit risks, market risks, liquidity risks, 
administrative risks, and systemic risks[,] . . . control these risks 
adequately . . . [and] must be responsive to the scope of the 
company’s business, any unique qualities of that business, and 
similar issues . . . . [D]irectors, in their capacity as members of 
the board of directors, and in their capacity as representative 
directors or as directors who manage business operations, owe a 
duty to the company to establish an internal control system . . . . 
[B]ecause statutory auditors . . . are responsible for monitoring 
the company’s operations, they are responsible for monitoring 
whether directors are maintaining the internal control system.91 
 
The court further explained that this obligation was part of the 
directors’ duties under Commercial Code Article 266, para 1, no. 5.92 
From a practical standpoint, the scope and nature of the duty to 
establish an internal control system is inextricably tied to the depth of review 
that courts will apply when a plaintiff later challenges the system’s 
adequacy.  Accordingly, in order to fully appraise the duty created by the 
court it is necessary to understand the specifics of the court’s review and 
analysis of the internal control system.  This is easier said than done, as the 
Daiwa court’s analysis is abstruse and inconsistent.  The greatest challenge 
to a coherent understanding is that it is not clear what standard of review the 
court employed.  The court noted that it should evaluate the risk 
management system according to the standards in existence during the time 
in question, that the “specifics of the risk management system are a matter of 
business judgment” and that directors “are afforded wide discretion in such 
matters.”93  However, the court then went on to substantively analyze 
whether each of the alleged deficiencies in the internal control system 
reflected inadequate implementation of risk management procedures.94  It is 
                                                
90  Id. at 13. 
91  Id. at 32-33. 
92  Shinsaku Iwahara, supra note 29, at 11; the Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 32-33. 
93  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 33. 
94  Id. at 33-37. 
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unclear whether the court applied the business judgment rule here, especially 
when this portion of the opinion is contrasted with the court’s later analysis 
of the directors’ violations of U.S. law.95 
In its opinion, the court first articulated several specific risks that an 
internal control system must address, but did not clarify whether this 
analysis reflected current industry practices or practices in effect during the 
period of Iguchi’s unauthorized trading.96, 97  The court then abruptly moved 
on to address the plaintiffs’ allegations of inadequacy with regard to the risk 
management system.98  Throughout its analysis, the court judged that certain 
elements of the system were “inadequate.”99  The court at no point 
elucidated what standard it was employing to evaluate the internal control 
system, but it concluded that the method for confirming the balance of 
Treasury bonds in the New York office was “egregiously inappropriate” and 
ultimately found one director liable on that basis.100 
In light of this analysis, one can deduce that if deference to directors’ 
business judgments offers any protection against a deep substantive review 
of the internal control system, that protection vanishes when the measures in 
place are “egregiously inappropriate” or possibly at a lower threshold.  In 
short, in evaluating what it describes as “business judgments” with respect to 
the internal control system in the First Case, the court addressed the 
plaintiffs’ allegations by probing into the various component elements of 
those business judgments without articulating a standard of review (though 
                                                
95  The court’s analysis of Daiwa’s violations of U.S. law includes a section explicitly titled “The 
Business Judgment Rule,” which explains the basis for the rule and why the rule does not apply in this 
case; an analogous section is conspicuously absent from the court’s analysis of the internal control system.  
Yet, as noted earlier, the court did state explicitly that the particulars of the internal control system are a 
“matter of business judgment” (keiei handan no mondai).  Id. at 41 (marking the start of the court’s 
business judgment analysis for the decision to violate U.S. law); id. at 33 (describing the internal control 
system as a matter of “business judgment”).  This vague reference to “business judgment” without an 
explicit application of the business judgment rule has even appeared in a more recent decision from the 
Supreme Court of Japan.  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 15, 2010, 2091 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 90, 93 
(Japan). 
96  The court stated in part that (1) trading in securities creates a risk that traders may abuse their 
authority, seek to conceal their losses, and then increase those losses in a failed attempt at concealment; and 
(2) the custody business entails the risk that the custodian will sell the assets in custody without permission.  
The court then stated that a company must develop an effective internal control system in order to minimize 
these risks.  These criteria highlighted by the court are remarkably similar to the precise actions that Daiwa 
Bank failed to prevent, making the potential influence of hindsight hard to ignore.  The Daiwa Bank Case, 
supra note 9, at 33. 
97  It seems likely, furthermore, that the court’s analysis was not consistent with industry standards at 
the time.  Shinsaku Iwahara, supra note 29, at 12. 
98  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 33-34. 
99  Id. at 35. 
100  Id.  Ichijirushiku tekisetsusa wo kaite ita, in the original Japanese, is here translated as 
“egregiously inappropriate.”  
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at times mentioning “adequacy”). The court then reviewed its own adequacy 
inquiry for any elements of the business judgments that were “egregiously 
inappropriate.”  There does not appear to be a threshold procedural inquiry 
that could foreclose substantive review. 
Given the court’s sprawling and deep analysis, the duty of directors to 
establish an internal control system would appear to encompass more than a 
simple reporting and control structure.  Rather, directors appear to be 
obligated as part of their fiduciary duties to establish a complex and 
sophisticated network of controls, perhaps even beyond industry 
standards.101  In evaluating this approach, Delaware case law provides a 
helpful point of reference.102 
 
2.  A Comparison with Delaware Law 
 
In this area, the Daiwa case is most clearly comparable to the seminal 
Delaware internal control system case, In re Caremark International Inc. 
Derivative Litigation.103  There are, however, key differences between the 
standards articulated by the Daiwa and Caremark courts with regard to what 
will fulfill the internal control system requirement.  Most notably, while the 
Daiwa standard involves an exacting evaluation of the substance of the 
internal control system, the Caremark standard provides that “only a 
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an 
utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting 
system exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary 
condition to liability.”104  The Caremark approach is easy to reconcile with 
the policy considerations behind the business judgment rule,105 as it is 
designed to “mak[e] board service by qualified persons more likely,” and 
“act as a stimulus to good faith performance of duty by such directors.”106 
The starkly different degrees of analysis to which the Daiwa court and 
the Caremark court subjected their defendants’ respective internal control 
systems reflect the different approaches of the Daiwa and Caremark courts 
                                                
101 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
102  Delaware jurisprudence is a useful point of comparison due to the high level of sophistication and 
wide influence of Delaware corporate law decisions.  See generally supra note 12. 
103 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996); Aronson, 
supra note 17, at 34-36 (drawing the connection to Caremark and providing substantial comparative 
analysis). 
104  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. 
105  For more detail on the business judgment rule, see infra Part III.C-D.  
106  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971 (italics omitted). 
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with regard to the business judgment rule.107  Whereas the Caremark court 
eschewed substantive analysis of business decisions,108 the Daiwa court 
engaged in such analysis without reservation; whereas the Caremark court 
required virtual absence of an internal control system for a finding of 
liability,109 the Daiwa court found a director liable for hundreds of millions 
of dollars despite the undeniable existence of a functional, if inadequate, 
internal control system within Daiwa Bank. 
The Daiwa opinion illustrates the perils of a rule that requires courts 
to wade into the substance of the internal control system.  Not only did the 
Daiwa court apply its internal control review standards in an apparently 
retroactive manner, the criteria espoused by the court also put an enormous 
burden on defendant directors who wish to argue, as part of their defense, 
that their internal controls were consistent with industry standards.  Such 
directors confront the unenviable task of persuading another industry player 
to expose itself to criticism or perhaps even liability by testifying that its 
internal control system was comparable to the defendant directors’ allegedly 
inadequate system.110 
In 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court scrutinized the Caremark 
standards in Stone v. Ritter, another landmark case.111  Aside from endorsing 
the standard of director liability articulated in Caremark, the court 
underscored the extreme difficulty of establishing director liability for a 
failure to monitor.112  The court noted: 
 
[I]mposition of liability requires a showing that the directors 
knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations . 
. . [P]laintiffs’ complaint seeks to equate a bad outcome with 
bad faith . . . [but] [i]n the absence of red flags, good faith in the 
context of oversight must be measured by directors’ actions “to 
assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists” 
and not by second-guessing after the occurrence of employee 
conduct that results in an unintended adverse outcome.113   
 
                                                
107  As discussed in supra Part III.B.1, it is not entirely clear if the court’s analysis of the internal 
control system reflects an application of the Japanese business judgment rule.  See infra Part III.D for 
further comparative analysis of the business judgment rule. 
108 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. 
109 Id. 
110  The Practical Effects of the Commercial Code Reform on Corporate Governance, supra note 56, 
at 17. 
111  Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
112 Id. at 373. 
113 Id. (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)). 
APRIL 2015 JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LAW   
 
 
337 
Delaware courts thus consider director decisions with regard to the 
structure of an internal control system to be no less deserving of business 
judgment protection than other types of business decisions.114  Furthermore, 
the Delaware rule is not necessarily a total bar to director liability in 
circumstances such as the Daiwa Bank Case; Stone v. Ritter leaves open the 
possibility that “‘red flags’ can be pled with sufficient particularity” to 
suggest director malfeasance sufficient for at least excusal of the demand 
requirement, and some non-Delaware courts have applied the Caremark 
standard this way.115 
 The Daiwa plaintiffs might have explored this red flags argument.  
Although Daiwa Bank had passed various inspections and examinations at 
the hands of several regulatory entities without incident, other red flags were 
nonetheless present.  For example, in 1988, the Ministry of Finance 
informed Daiwa Bank that its “Treasury bond trading volume [wa]s 
unusually high” and that it should “reduce trading volume.”116  Mail from 
securities firms also continued to arrive at the bank’s downtown custody 
office due to Iguchi’s continued trading in that office even after Daiwa 
formally ceased all securities trading in the custody office.117  Furthermore, 
Daiwa’s New York branch at one point transferred Treasury bond traders 
from its downtown to its midtown office in order to avoid the exposure of 
unauthorized, continued trading at the downtown office during an 
investigation by the F.R.B.118  Finally, in 1993, Daiwa Bank’s Americas 
Strategy Office informed the bank’s New York branch manager that the 
trading of Treasury bonds in the downtown custody office was illegal, and a 
Japanese governmental inspector also warned the manager that Iguchi 
should not be responsible for both the custodial business and the trading of 
Treasury bonds.119 
The Daiwa Bank Case serves as a useful example of the advantages of 
the Delaware formulation of the duty to monitor.  The plaintiffs in the Daiwa 
                                                
114  Id.  Although the good faith analysis is technically not an application of the business judgment 
rule per se, Stone v. Ritter sets forth an extremely deferential standard that is highly protective of directors’ 
business judgments.  See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).  
115  Paul L. Lee, Risk Management and the Role of the Board of Directors: Regulatory Expectations 
and Shareholder Actions, 125 BANKING L.J. 679 (2008).  See, e.g., Rich ex rel. Fuqi Intern., Inc. v. Yu 
Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 977 (Del. 2013) (Addressing a derivative claim in the corporate oversight 
context:  “[W]here the plaintiff by particularized pleading has raised a reasonable doubt that the board’s 
actions are in compliance with its fiduciary duties, Rule 23.1 [of the Delaware Chancery Court Rules, 
requiring that plaintiffs allege with particularity the efforts made to obtain the desired action from the 
corporate directors,] is satisfied and the plaintiff may proceed derivatively.”). 
116  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 11. 
117  Id. at 10-11. 
118  Id. at 11. 
119  Id.  Daiwa also received warnings from the Bank of New York.  See supra Part II.A. 
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Bank Case had a colorable and perhaps compelling argument that sufficient 
red flags existed, at least with respect to certain directors, for failure to 
improve the internal control system to amount to a conscious disregard of 
the duty to monitor.  In analyzing such a claim, the Daiwa court might have 
been able both to avoid second-guessing directors’ business decisions and to 
incentivize diligent responses on the part of directors to warnings that arise 
through the internal control system.  However, given that directors are able 
to assume that delegees responsible for implementing and maintaining 
particular aspects of the internal control system are acting in good faith, it is 
unlikely that any red-flag-based claims in the Daiwa case would have 
implicated all of the defendant directors who were implicated by the 
plaintiffs’ allegations of substantive deficiencies in the internal control 
system.120  Yet the Daiwa court only found one director ultimately liable for 
damages in the First Case, so the plaintiffs might well have achieved the 
same outcome under this alternative theory of liability.  With this duty now 
being applied to a potentially broader scope than in the past,121 Japanese 
courts should consider the potential benefits of a Delaware-style analysis. 
 
3.  Subsequent Developments in Japanese Law 
 
Legal reforms in Japan subsequent to the Daiwa Bank Case have 
fleshed out the Daiwa court’s partially inchoate standards.  The Japanese 
duty to establish an internal control system, which was not codified when the 
Daiwa opinion was released,122 now appears in Company Law Article 362, 
para. 4, no. 6, which requires, among other things, that directors establish a 
means for insuring that the directors’ duties and the company’s business are 
executed in accordance with applicable laws and with the company’s articles 
of incorporation.123  Company Law Enforcement Regulation No. 100, para. 1 
also provides some particular, if vague, internal control requirements for 
joint stock corporations.  For example, a company must establish a system 
for maintaining and managing information related to directors’ execution of 
their duties, and must implement a system for managing the risk of loss to 
the corporation.124 
                                                
120  The plaintiffs brought suit against a total of 38 directors and statutory auditors in the First Case.  
The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 10. 
121 See infra Part III.B.3. 
122 The duty was first codified in 2002, in SHŌHŌTOKUREIHŌ [COMMERCIAL CODE SPECIAL 
STATUTES] art. 21-7, para. 1, no. 2 (Japan).  See KENJIRŌ EGASHIRA, supra note 75, at 371 n. 4. 
123 YOSHINORI TSUCHIDA, NAIBUTŌSEI NO JITSUMU [INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS IN PRACTICE] 3, 6 
(2d ed. 2007).  
124 Id. at 3. 
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Subsequent legal reforms also require that directors, upon establishing 
an internal control system, publish a summary of the system in the 
corporation’s business report.125  In the report, directors must include an 
auditors’ evaluation of their internal control system, including its adequacy 
or lack thereof, and an explanation of the reasons for any inadequacy.126  
Financial Products Trading Law Article 24-4, para. 4, no. 1 provides further 
evaluation and reporting requirements for listed companies. 127   As 
articulated in the Daiwa Bank Case, directors also owe to the company a 
duty to supervise other corporate actors’ fulfillment of their duties.128  
Given that internal control systems are subjected to increased 
extrajudicial scrutiny under the subsequent codification of internal control 
rules, one might think that Japanese courts would be free to take a more 
hands-off approach when inquiring into the adequacy of a corporation’s 
internal control system, but the legacy of Daiwa lives on.  The Fukuoka 
District Court, in a surprising 2011 ruling that was subsequently affirmed by 
the Fukuoka High Court, held that directors violated their duty to monitor 
for reasons that included their failure to detect fraudulent business practices 
at a subsidiary.129  Although the prevailing wisdom among Japanese legal 
scholars at the time was that directors have a duty to understand the business 
of their employer-company’s subsidiaries in light of the fact that the 
subsidiaries’ equity is an asset of the parent company, the traditional view in 
Japan was that directors do not have a duty to specifically monitor 
compliance at these subsidiaries. 130   Accordingly, the Fukuoka rulings 
represent an unexpected and potentially substantial expansion of the scope 
with which Japanese courts may apply the standards originating in Daiwa. 
Lastly, following post-Daiwa reforms to Japan’s Company Law, an 
important similarity with Delaware has emerged with respect to limitations 
on liability.  Under Delaware law, directors’ monitoring duty is a component 
of the duty of good faith, which is a subordinate element of the duty of 
                                                
125 Id. at 7. 
126 Id. 
127 KENJIRŌ EGASHIRA, supra note 75, at 371 n.4. 
128 The Daiwa court held that directors are generally allowed to delegate specific monitoring tasks and 
assume that the delegees are executing their duties in good faith absent extraordinary circumstances 
indicating otherwise.  This ability to delegate, however, does not relieve directors of their duty to monitor.  
The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 38.  Although this, and the principle that directors must establish an 
internal control system, are now commonly accepted, the Daiwa Bank Case remains one of the leading 
cases on this point.  See KENJIRŌ EGASHIRA, supra note 75, at 430 (the first relevant citation is to The 
Daiwa Bank Case). 
129 Judgment of Jan. 26, 2011, Fukuoka Chihō Saibansho [Fukuoka Dist. Ct.], Jan. 26, 2011, 1367 
KINYŪ SHŌJI HANREI [KINYŪ HANREI] 41, 62-63 (Japan), aff’d by Fukuoka Kōtō Saibansho [Fukuoka High 
Ct.] Apr. 13, 2013, 1399 KINYŪ  SHŌJI HANREI [KINYŪ HANREI] 24, 31 (Japan).   
130 Yasushi Ito, supra note 8, at 13–14. 
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loyalty, and in Delaware director liability cannot be reduced or eliminated 
for violations of the duty of loyalty.131  In Japan, limitations on director 
liability extend only to findings of simple negligence, so, as in Delaware, 
director liability is probably unlimited for a sustained and repeated failure to 
respond to significant red flags.132  
 
C. The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in the Daiwa Bank Case 
 
1. The Business Judgment Rule in Relation to the Internal Control 
System (The First Case) 
 
As described in Part III.B.1 above, the Daiwa court’s analysis of the 
internal control system appears to reflect an application of the business 
judgment rule, but this is not perfectly clear.  Because the concerns that 
animate the business judgment rule are generally applicable to a judicial 
analysis of the specifics of a company’s internal control system,133 this 
article will also address the Daiwa court’s internal control analysis from a 
business judgment rule perspective.  While analysis in Part III.B focuses on 
the duty to establish an internal control system and the scope of that duty, 
the analysis in Part III.D focuses specifically on the business judgment rule, 
both as applied in the Daiwa Bank Case and generally.  Admittedly, these 
concepts are not perfectly separable given that the nature of the duty to 
establish an internal control system is defined in part by the level of business 
judgment protection courts will afford directors in fulfilling that duty.134 
However, bifurcating the analysis is useful as the business judgment rule is 
an important concept that merits discussion in its own right.  Accordingly, 
Part III.D.1 addresses the court’s business judgment analysis with respect to 
both the First Case and the Second Case. 
 
 
                                                
131 Rebecca Walker, The Importance of Board Oversight of a Company’s Compliance Program: The 
Implications of Stone v. Ritter, 1731 PLI/CORP 559, 566 (2009). 
132 KIICHI GOTŌ, SHINKAISHAHŌ [THE NEW COMPANY LAW] 304 (2008).  See infra Part III.E for a 
discussion on Japanese limits on director liability. 
133 Delaware courts’ approach to internal control system analysis is designed to “mak[e] board service 
by qualified persons more likely,” and “act as a stimulus to good faith performance of duty by such 
directors.”  In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also supra 
Part III.B.2. 
134 See supra Part III.B.1. 
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2. The Business Judgment Rule in Relation to Corporate Criminality 
(The Second Case) 
 
 The Osaka District Court’s analysis of the Daiwa directors’ violations 
of U.S. law was groundbreaking.135  In determining the scope of “laws and 
regulations” with which directors must comply, the court states with little 
analysis that directors’ duty to obey the laws extends to the laws of foreign 
countries because “[o]beying the laws is the very basis of corporate 
management” and that “Commercial Code Article 266, para. 1, no. 5 not 
only requires compliance with the laws of Japan, but also requires 
compliance with the laws of any country into which the company expands 
its business.”136  The defendant directors argued that the business judgment 
rule should apply to their actions and that these were difficult business 
decisions made in a good faith attempt to deal with a massive scandal at a 
time of great uncertainty in the banking industry.137  In response, the court 
explored the possibility of providing business judgment rule protection to 
the directors’ actions.138 
 
D. The Substance of the Daiwa Court’s Business Judgment Rule Analysis 
 
1. Analysis and Comparison to Delaware Law 
 
The Daiwa court’s business judgment rule analysis in the Second Case 
is simpler and easier to address than in the First Case.  In the Second Case, 
before the court explicated the business judgment rule, it moved through 
each group of directors and analyzed whether those directors breached their 
fiduciary duties in connection with the bank’s actions that led to its 
indictment.139  Here, the court’s analysis becomes notably muddled.  While 
it would seem simple enough to at least argue that some of the defendant 
directors were engaged in a criminal conspiracy to commit some of the 
illegal acts for which Daiwa was indicted, and thus ineligible for business 
judgment rule protection, the court brushed past this line of reasoning.  It 
ultimately found that several directors breached their fiduciary duties by, if 
                                                
135 Shinsaku Iwahara, Daiwa Ginkō Daihyō Soshō Jiken Isshin Hanketsu To Daihyo Soshō Seido 
Kaisei Mondai (Ka) [The Daiwa Bank Derivative Suit Trial Court Opinion and Issues of Reform of the 
Derivative Suit System (Part II)], 1577 SHŌJI HŌMU 4, 4 (Nov. 15, 2000). 
136 The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 39.  This unprecedented holding is discussed in greater 
detail at infra Part III.D.3. 
137 The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 41-42. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 40-41. 
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not ordering illegal activities themselves, then “at the very least” failing to 
prevent those illegal activities.140  This is extraordinary because, although 
illegal activities are not afforded business judgment protection,141 the court 
did not clarify what specific illegal activities took place in order to justify 
stripping business judgment protection from certain directors.142 
One can easily conceive of at least a minimally credible explanation 
of why a bank director might make a good faith judgment that later turned 
out to allow or even facilitate illegal activity on the part of other bank 
managers or employees.143  However, the Daiwa court did not appear to 
consider this possibility.  Instead, the court simplistically explained that the 
business judgment “discretion accorded to directors does not extend to 
decisions to violate laws, and it is not for directors to decide whether to obey 
laws, including the laws of foreign countries” without explicating how 
precisely these directors had violated the law.144  The absence of a thorough 
justification for stripping business judgment protection from the directors 
who were not criminally charged may reflect the unusual circumstances of 
the case; it is certainly possible that the Daiwa court was uncomfortable 
concluding that these individual directors had violated U.S. law without 
some kind of a U.S. court decision to substantiate such an interpretation.  
Nonetheless, omitting a necessary step of the liability analysis further 
confuses the issue of when business judgment protection should apply. 
By comparison, it is not clear that Delaware’s business judgment rule 
classifies all director decisions to take illegal corporate action as breaches of 
the duty of care, especially in cases where the director is not aware that the 
action is illegal.145  Accordingly, it is hard to imagine that mere failure to 
prevent illegal activities “at the very least” would be sufficient grounds for 
stripping business judgment rule protection and finding director liability 
                                                
140 Id. 
141 The majority view in Japan appears to be that the business judgment rule does not apply even to 
inadvertent, non-negligent violations of law, but if a director can show a lack of both knowledge and 
negligence, she can nonetheless avoid liability. KENJIRŌ EGASHIRA, KABUSHIKIGAISHAHŌ TAIKEI [SERIES 
ON THE LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS] 316 (1st ed. 2013). 
142 Furthermore, in stating its decision, the court did not explicitly reference any failure-to-monitor 
standard other than asserting that certain directors should have been able to prevent the illegal activity.  
Accordingly, it is not entirely clear if a business decision related to monitoring or simply a lack of action is 
what the court deemed to be a breach of fiduciary duty.  This makes analysis from a business judgment 
standpoint somewhat difficult.  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 40-41. 
143 For example, the director may have believed that the behavior was not in fact illegal and even 
received advice from a lawyer to that effect.  Alternatively, the director may have believed that the actions 
necessary to ensure prevention of the illegal activity were beyond her individual authority and 
extraordinarily costly while the risks involved were exceedingly low. 
144 The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 42. 
145 See, e.g., Thomas A. Uebler, Shareholder Police Power: Shareholders’ Ability to Hold Directors 
Accountable for Intentional Violations of Law, 33 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 199, 206-07, 213-14.  
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under the Delaware standard.146  Indeed, the standard set by the Daiwa court 
would significantly impair the efficacy of the business judgment rule, 
especially in situations where the illegal nature of the corporate action is 
unclear and the directors have acted in good faith. 
Compared to the Second Case, the business judgment analysis in the 
First Case is more complicated and confused.  Most notably, the court’s 
approach to the plaintiffs’ allegations is deeply substantive and in that sense 
remarkably different from business judgment analysis under Delaware law.  
Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is:  
 
[A] presumption that in making a business decision the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the 
best interests of the company . . . . The burden is on the party 
challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the 
presumption . . . . 
 
[T]o invoke the rule's protection directors have a duty to inform 
themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material 
information reasonably available to them.  Having become so 
informed, they must then act with requisite care in the discharge 
of their duties.  While the Delaware cases use a variety of terms 
to describe the applicable standard of care . . . under the 
business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon 
concepts of gross negligence.147 
 
In contrast to the Delaware rule, in addressing the plaintiffs’ argument 
that the directors failed to implement an effective internal control system, 
the Osaka District Court found, for example, that the defendants’ failure to 
implement a system of surprise inspections was “not necessarily an 
inadequate inspection method when examined from a risk-management 
perspective.”148  This kind of inquiry into whether the particulars of the 
                                                
146 The standard in Delaware seems to require at least some measure of scienter.  See, e.g., Desimone 
v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 935 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Caremark itself encouraged directors to act with 
reasonable diligence, but plainly held that director liability for failure to monitor required a finding that the 
directors acted with the state of mind traditionally used to define the mindset of a disloyal director—bad 
faith—because their indolence was so persistent that it could not be ascribed to anything other than a 
knowing decision not to even try to make sure the corporation's officers had developed and were 
implementing a prudent approach to ensuring law compliance.”). 
147 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
148 The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 35. 
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business decision do or do not measure up to the court’s standards of 
“adequacy” is exactly the type of analysis that the Delaware business 
judgment rule appears designed to obviate.  Application of the Delaware 
business judgment rule would require that the court stop its inquiry 
immediately upon finding a “rational business purpose” for the directors’ 
actions, absent certain other special circumstances, such as self-dealing.149  
In Daiwa, the defendants argued that providing prior notice of inspections 
was a measure designed to speed up the inspection process, which, 
disingenuous or not, surely amounts to a rational business purpose.150  Had 
these allegations been made before a Delaware court, the liability analysis 
would almost certainly have stopped there if it were not already foreclosed 
by Caremark.151 
 Although the Daiwa court’s analysis of the bank’s internal control 
system differs starkly from an application of the Delaware business 
judgment rule, that does not mean that the analysis is necessarily faulty 
under Japanese law.  At the time of the Daiwa case, there was not a clear-cut 
distinction between substantive and procedural business judgment analysis 
as there exists in Delaware.152  In his writing on Daiwa, Professor Aronson 
takes a generally positive view of the court’s internal control analysis, 
describing it as a new duty of oversight “formulated within the Japanese 
courts’ existing framework of examining liability based primarily on a 
director’s supervision over a particular business department.”153  Professor 
Aronson does criticize the court’s business judgment analysis but does not 
do so harshly.  
Nonetheless, the logical underpinnings of the Japanese business 
judgment rule are generally analogous to those articulated by Delaware 
courts.154, 155  Furthermore, the reasons that Delaware courts refuse to engage 
                                                
149 The Delaware business judgment rule “posits a powerful presumption in favor of actions taken by 
the directors in that a decision made by a loyal and informed board will not be overturned by the courts 
unless it cannot be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.’”  Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 
A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).  The 
Daiwa court’s analysis of the various elements of the internal control system for adequacy and efficacy 
reaches much deeper into the realm of director discretion than would a mere search for a “rational business 
purpose.” 
150 The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 12-13. 
151 Caremark is discussed in greater detail in supra Part III.B.2. 
152 See KAZUSHI YOSHIHARA ET AL., KAISHAHŌ [CORPORATE LAW] 163, 164 (2d ed. 2001) (roughly 
contemporaneous with the Daiwa decision) (describing the business judgment rule as a tool with which to 
determine whether directors had acted negligently in violation of Commercial Code Article 266). 
153 Aronson, supra note 17, at 59.  Professor Aronson does note in a different article that hindsight 
bias presents a significant problem in the Daiwa case.  See Aronson, supra note 63, at 237. 
154 See KENJIRŌ EGASHIRA, supra note 75, at 428 n.3 (noting that the Japanese business judgment rule 
is designed to prevent directors from avoiding risk when doing so does not work to maximize shareholder 
wealth and to avoid retroactively evaluating directors’ decisions in a way that will make them risk-averse); 
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in substantive analysis of directors’ business judgments apply just as well to 
corporate directors in Japan as they do to those in the United States.  Most 
salient are courts’ “institutional incompetence . . . to pass upon the wisdom 
of business decisions,” the risk of incentivizing directors to become 
excessively risk-averse, and the risk of deterring promising candidates for 
directorship from service.156  Problems of hindsight bias also may skew 
courts’ concepts of what risks were or were not foreseeable.157 
In the context of Daiwa, Professor Aronson has suggested that 
“traditional views hostile to public disclosure of confidential corporate 
processes” and “the absence of an effective litigation discovery system” may 
make it difficult for plaintiffs to obtain “sufficient information on the 
decision-making process.”158  Professor Aronson argues that these concerns 
may justify an inquiry into the substance of directors’ business decisions.159  
While this analysis may accurately pinpoint the motivation behind the 
substantive component of Japanese business judgment analysis, the lack of 
an effective discovery system and lack of corporate disclosure are more 
likely to exacerbate rather than legitimate the shortcomings of substantive 
business judgment inquiries.  Plaintiffs, rarely able to obtain evidence 
relating to the process of a business judgment, must logically focus their 
claims on substantive flaws in the judgment.  Information related to the 
substance and results of business judgments is much more likely to be 
obtainable through news sources or other public records compared to 
information relating to the decision-making process itself.  The Daiwa case 
itself provides a fine example; many of the plaintiffs’ allegations concerned 
the substantive elements of the internal control system but none of their 
allegations focused on the process of decision-making that shaped the 
                                                                                                                                            
see GARY LOCKWOOD, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES 
§ 2:12 (2014) (stating, among other reasons, that the business judgment rule “serves to give managers 
sufficient latitude in decision-making to avoid the overly conservative management that would be the likely 
result of excessive exposure to liability”). 
155 This claim is not entirely without controversy.  See Hatsuru Morita, Wagakoku Ni Keieihandan 
Gensoku Wa Sonzai Shite Ita No Ka [Did the Business Judgment Rule Ever Exist in Japan?], 1858 SHŌJI 
HŌMU 4 (Feb. 25, 2009) (arguing that the Japanese business judgment rule does not appear to be grounded 
in the current contractual theory animating the Delaware rule but nonetheless agreeing that it arises from a 
delegation of authority). 
156 LOCKWOOD, supra note 154, at nn.18-20 (citing Freedman v. Restaurant Associates Industries, 
Inc., 1987 WL 14323, *8 (Del. Ch. 1987) (unreported)); John C. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: 
The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26 (Oct. 1986) (noting that outside directors are 
likely to be risk-averse because they face substantial liability but have a relatively small stake in the 
corporation); see also Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 200 A.2d 398, 401 (Pa. 1964)). 
157 Aronson, supra note 63, at 237. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
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contours of the internal control system.160  Thus, the Osaka District Court’s 
only means of providing relief in the First Case necessitated a substantive 
analysis of the directors’ decisions.  The Daiwa Bank Case represents an 
example in which substantive review is not only permitted but instead 
becomes, in a judicial system with ineffective discovery and lack of 
corporate disclosure, a virtual prerequisite to granting relief. 
Despite the Daiwa court’s apparent difficulty in granting relief to the 
First Case plaintiffs without a substantive inquiry, common fears about 
substantive business judgment review appear well-founded when stacked 
side-by-side with the Daiwa court’s internal control system analysis.  
Notably, the Daiwa court “focuse[d] narrowly on a detailed aspect of 
internal controls that arguably may not have been considered significant 
under the prevailing standards during that period.” 161   The defendant 
directors argued that, “although the particular New York branch had been 
audited by an external auditor, inspected by both the Japanese and U.S. 
banking supervisory authorities, and had been subjected to internal auditing 
by the bank’s internal American auditor,” none of these entities indicated 
any deficiency in the method of confirming the balance of custodial 
securities.162  The Daiwa court brushed aside these arguments, noting that it 
lacked enough evidence to conclude that the sundry examinations and 
investigations proved that Daiwa’s internal control system was adequate, 
and that whether Daiwa Bank’s practices were standard for the industry at 
the time was not dispositive as to whether the internal control system was 
flawed.163 
The fundamental problem is not that the court necessarily reached an 
incorrect result.  Instead, the issue is that systemic pressures on the plaintiffs 
to make allegations rooted in the substance of business judgments 
effectively precluded any finding of liability based on the directors’ 
decision-making processes.  As a result, even if the directors’ decisions to 
ignore warnings relating to the internal control system would have amounted 
procedurally to a breach of the duty of care or good faith, the Daiwa court 
had no basis for finding liability on those grounds.  It is certainly 
conceivable that Daiwa Bank’s internal control system had major flaws, 
perhaps even flaws so significant that failure to remedy them amounted to a 
breach of the duty of care on the part of the directors.  Indeed, other 
                                                
160 The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 10-11 (The closest the Plaintiffs come to making a 
process-based claim is noting that Daiwa ignored a warning from the Ministry of Finance that it should 
reduce trading volume in its overseas securities finance division.). 
161 Aronson, supra note 63, at 237. 
162  Mitsuru Misawa, supra note 29, at 13. 
163 The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 3, 37.  
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evidence buttresses this argument: as U.S. authorities investigated Iguchi’s 
trades they discovered that Daiwa Bank Trust Company had also engaged in 
unlisted trading of U.S. Treasury bonds and had concealed $97 million in 
losses through a scheme involving a collection of Cayman Islands shell 
companies.164  However, process is not a focus of the court’s analysis and 
the lack of discovery surely limited the ability of the First Case plaintiffs to 
make a compelling case on a procedural basis.  The practical result of this 
system is thus a business judgment rule that is entirely substantive. 
The Daiwa opinion demonstrates with remarkable clarity the perils of 
such a rule.  Even the Osaka District Court itself acknowledged that the 
particular methods of a company’s international control system that a board 
of directors elects to implement or sanction reflect a combination of business 
judgments that should ordinarily be within directors’ discretion.165  And yet, 
with the door to process-based remedies closed, the court evaluated the 
substance of the internal control system, enjoying perfect hindsight, delving 
deep into the particulars of the control mechanisms, and ultimately finding 
staggering amounts of liability on the part of one director.  This kind of 
result, only encouraged by the lack of discovery in the Japanese judicial 
system, is likely to incentivize excessively risk-averse behavior on the part 
of directors and discourage qualified candidates from becoming directors.166 
 
2. Subsequent Developments in Japanese Business Judgment Law 
 
Japanese scholars are well aware of the concerns that give rise to the 
Delaware formulation of the business judgment rule, 167  but despite 
occasional contrary voices,168 joint procedural and substantive analysis has 
                                                
164  Mitsuru Misawa, supra note 29, at 1028-29. 
165 The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 33. 
166 In fact, the legal reforms limiting directors’ liability enacted after the Daiwa case were in part a 
political response to fear of lawsuits on the part of directors.  The Practical Effects of the Commercial Code 
Reform on Corporate Governance, supra note 56, at 13.  See infra Part III.E for a discussion of the liability 
reforms. 
167 See, e.g., TAKESHI KAMEYAMA, KAISHA KEIEI TO TORISHIMARIYAKU NO SEKININ [CORPORATE 
MANAGEMENT AND DIRECTOR LIABILITY], 133-135 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that the business judgment rule 
allows directors, rather than judges, to make business decisions, that retroactive evaluations of directors’ 
decisions are problematic, and that directors must take risks); Takurō Yamaguchi, supra note 65, at 35 
(stating that the business judgment rule allows directors to focus on business management without fear of 
excessive liability). 
168 Yasushi Ito, Apamanshoppu Kabunushi Daihyō Sosho Jōkoku Shinhanketsu [Decision on the 
Apamanshoppu Shareholder Derivative Suit Appeal], 2209 SHŌJI HŌMU 51, 55 (Sept. 15, 2013) (noting that 
there are Japanese legal scholars who argue that the inquiry into business decisions should be confined 
entirely to process). 
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become the business judgment standard for Japanese courts.169  The widely 
publicized Daiwa case has likely contributed to this development.  Indeed, 
the basic standards utilized by the Osaka District Court are alive and well 
today in Japanese corporate law.  In decisions issued in 2013, the Tokyo 
District Court described the business judgment rule as an inquiry into 
whether the relevant business decision was “egregiously unreasonable,”170 
and the Osaka District Court described the failure to establish an 
“adequate”171 risk management system as a violation of the duties of care 
and loyalty.172  Furthermore, a 2010 decision from the Supreme Court of 
Japan suggests that the Supreme Court itself approves of an inquiry for 
business judgments that is both procedural and substantive.173  Although this 
particular holding is not broadly applicable by its terms, at least one 
Japanese scholar has advocated its widespread adoption by other courts.174  
Interestingly, there has been some disagreement by Japanese courts as to 
whether “unreasonable” or “egregiously unreasonable” is the proper 
standard for the process prong of the business judgment analysis, and the 
Supreme Court’s decision notably applied the “egregiously unreasonable” 
standard to both process and substance.175  In 2014, the Tokyo District Court 
seemed to directly adopt this standard, suggesting that it is likely to appear 
soon in additional Japanese corporate governance cases.176  
                                                
169 Historically, the majority interpretation of the Japanese business judgment rule has looked for 
either (1) an unreasonable mistake in the decision-making process, or (2) a decision that is “egregiously 
unreasonable” (ichijirishiku fugōri).  Tanaka Wataru, Keiei Handan To Torishimariyaku No Sekinin—
Apamanshoppu HD Kabunushidaihyō Soshō Jiken [Business Judgments and Director Liability—The 
Apamanshoppu HD Shareholder Derivative Suit], 1442 JURISUTO 101, 102-03 (June 2012).  This 
formulation does not seem too far afield from the Daiwa court’s evaluation of the internal control system 
for “egregiously inadequate” elements, although an “egregiously unreasonable” decision is also perhaps 
closer in nature to a decision with “no rational business purpose” (the Delaware business judgment 
standard) than is a decision that merely yields “egregiously inadequate” results.  Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).  For recent examples of courts applying joint procedural 
and substantive analysis, see Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] Sept. 10, 2013, Hei 24 (wa) 
no. 5142, WLJPCA 09108021, at 6 (Japan); Ōsaka Chihō Saibansho [Ōsaka Dist. Ct] Dec. 26, 2013, 1435 
KINYU SHŌJI HANREI [KINYU HANREI] 42, 61 (Japan). 
170 “Ichijirushiku fugōri,” Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] Sept. 10, 2013, Hei 24 (wa) no. 
5142, WLJPCA 09108021, at 6 (Japan). 
171 “Fujūbun Na Risuku Kanri Taisei,” Ōsaka Chihō Saibansho [Ōsaka Dist. Ct] Dec. 26, 2013, 
1435 KINYU SHŌJI HANREI [KINYU HANREI] 42, 61 (Japan).  
172 Id. 
173 Yasushi Ito, supra note 168, at 54 (noting that the Supreme Court of Japan’s statement that “to the 
extent the decision-making process and the decision itself were not egregiously unreasonable, the directors 
did not violate their duty of care” does not, without more, amount to a clear-cut application of the business 
judgment rule by the Supreme Court of Japan) (quoting Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jul. 15, 2010, 2091 
HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 90, 93 (Japan)). 
174 Tanaka Wataru, supra note 169, at 104. 
175 Id. 
176 Hiroaki Hara, Kanzen Kogaisha Ni Taisuru Kensetsukikai No Baikyaku To Kinin No Kashitsuke Ni 
Yoru Daihyō Torishimariyaku No Ninmuketaisekinin [Representative Director Liability for Breach of Duty 
APRIL 2015 JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LAW   
 
 
349 
Despite the now-established nature of substantive inquiry as a 
constituent element of Japanese business judgment analysis, the undesirable 
consequences of reviewing directors’ business decisions in hindsight and 
applying modern standards retroactively remain an issue.177  Furthermore, in 
the years since the Daiwa Bank Case, the causes for concern have increased.  
Japanese boards of directors remain largely opaque, and progress in 
introducing outside directors has generally been glacial in pace. 178  
Meanwhile, the scope of directors’ obligation to establish an internal control 
system may actually be expanding.  For example, in a recent ruling, the 
Fukuoka High Court found directors liable for breaching their duties of care 
and loyalty by failing to root out fraudulent business practices at a 
subsidiary, a decision that runs contrary to legal scholars’ conventional, 
narrower interpretation of the scope of the duty of oversight. 179  
Furthermore, the recent Company Law reforms may also marginally expand 
the scope of directors’ oversight duties.  Although the reforms may not 
further expand the conventional interpretation of directors’ duty to oversee 
subsidiaries, they may make it more difficult for courts to take the minority 
view that fundamentally no duty of subsidiary oversight exists.180 
In light of these factors, a joint procedural and substantive business 
judgment analysis is likely to keep plaintiffs and, as a result, courts focused 
on substance while promoting excessive risk-aversion181 and discouraging 
qualified candidates from serving as outside directors.182  These troublesome 
consequences have particular relevance now as they are directly contrary to 
                                                                                                                                            
Resulting from the Sale of Construction Equipment and Loans to a Wholly Owned Subsidiary], 1456 KINYŪ  
SHŌJI HANREI (KINYŪ  HANREI) 2, 4 (Jan. 1, 2015) (noting the clear influence of the Supreme Court’s 
holding on the Tokyo District Court’s analysis in the “G-Trading” case (Judgment of Apr. 10, 2014) (1443 
KINYŪ SHŌJI HANREI (KINYŪ  HANREI)  22 (June 15, 2014))).  
177 See supra Part III.D.1. 
178 See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi, Japanese Shareholders Starting to Show Their Teeth, N.Y. TIMES, June 
28, 2012, at B3 (At Mizuho Holdings, institutional shareholders helped Mizuho “defeat a shareholders’ 
proposal that would have simply required the bank to disclose what kind of training its new directors had 
received.”).  Additionally, as of 2012, “[a]bout half of the companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
[did] not have any outside directors on their boards, according to Nomura Securities.”  Id. 
179 Yasushi Ito, supra note 8, at 14. 
180 The conventional view is that directors already have some degree of duty to oversee their 
employer-company’s subsidiaries to the extent that the subsidiaries constitute important assets of the parent 
company.  According to Professor Shinsaku Iwahara, the Company Law reforms do not change this duty 
but simply codify it with increased clarity.  Shinsaku Iwahara et al., Kaiseikaishaō No Igi To Kongo No 
Kadai (Ka) [The Significance of the Amendments to the Company Law and Ongoing Topics for 
Discussion], 2042 SHŌJI HŌMU 4, 5 (Sept. 5, 2014). 
181 KENJIRŌ EGASHIRA, supra note 75, at 428 n.3 (noting that disincentivizing managerial risk-taking 
will not be to shareholders’ advantage). 
182 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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Prime Minister Abe’s push for innovation, independence, and increased 
transparency.183 
Admittedly, without reforms, a refusal on the part of Japanese courts 
to look into the substance of business decisions may pose an insurmountable 
barrier to plaintiffs seeking director liability in many cases.184  However, 
targeted reforms to allow limited discovery and increases in board 
transparency could allow courts to retain the advantages of the incentive 
structure provided by a non-substantive business judgment rule while also 
allowing plaintiffs relief in appropriate circumstances.  Until then, Japanese 
directors can expect to continue to grapple with the prospect of courts 
retroactively and substantively analyzing their business decisions and 
plaintiffs who focus on decisional substance rather than procedure as the 
most likely source of relief. 
 
3. Directors’ Duty to Obey Foreign Laws and Its Relation to the 
Business Judgment Rule 
 
 The Daiwa case is also seminal in that it represents the first holding 
by a Japanese court that “laws and regulations” as defined in Commercial 
Code Article 266185 include the laws of foreign countries.186  One criticism 
of this approach is that it may put corporate directors at the mercy of a 
plethora of foreign laws and regulations, rules about which even legal 
experts lack comprehensive knowledge.187  Today, this concern is far from 
hypothetical in light of far-reaching foreign laws and regulations such as the 
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act188 and sanctions administered through 
the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control.189  Running afoul of such rules is 
a real risk for many Japanese corporations.  Marubeni Corporation, for 
example, entered into a plea agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice 
in March of 2014 to pay an $88 million fine in connection with alleged 
                                                
183 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Launched His Third Arrow, WASH. POST (July 1, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/japanese-prime-minister-shinzo-abe-launched-his-third-
arrow/2014/07/01/3ed5c1ce-015b-11e4-8fd0-3a663dfa68ac_story.html. 
184 See Aronson, supra note 63, at 237 (the lack of an effective discovery system may “require” 
substantive analysis of business decisions). 
185 SHŌHŌ (COMM. C.) art. 266 (Japan) (repealed 2005).  It has since been replaced by Company Law, 
art. 355. 
186 Although groundbreaking, this decision was generally consistent with the logic of relevant 
precedent.  See Shinsaku Iwahara, supra note 135, at 4. 
187 See The Practical Effects of the Commercial Code Reform on Corporate Governance, supra note 
56, at 18–19. 
188 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq.  
189 See, e.g., Office of Foreign Assets Control: Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List, U.S. DEPT OF 
THE TREASURY. (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/ssi/ssi.pdf. 
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bribery in Indonesia.190  The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ is another 
example; the bank faced a $315 million fine as recently as November 2014 
for allegedly “misleading [U.S.] regulators regarding its transactions with 
Iran, Sudan, Myanmar, and other sanctioned entities.”191 
Nonetheless, this fiduciary duty to comply with law is only breached 
by negligent or intentional violations of law, and the Daiwa opinion appears 
to generally take this approach as well.192  Before it began its analysis of the 
directors’ violations of U.S. law, the Daiwa court stated that it must examine 
whether the directors “effectuated corporate management with the goal of 
complying with law.” 193   The court did not clarify exactly what the 
implications of this standard are (e.g., whether a finding that directors had a 
good faith intention to comply with law will accord their decision business 
judgment protection), and there was some debate at the time as to whether a 
good faith standard or a negligence standard should apply generally,194 
though either one could present a workable solution. 195   The court 
sidestepped questions of negligence and was perhaps partially justified in 
doing so as there was little question that certain defendant directors had 
intentionally violated U.S. law.196 
 The Delaware position on unwitting violation of the law may differ 
from the Japanese standard.  Delaware law similarly provides that 
knowingly causing a corporation to act unlawfully is a violation of the duty 
                                                
190 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Marubeni Corp. Agrees to Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery 
Charges and to Pay an $88 Million Fine (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/March/14-
crm-290.html; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bridgestone Corporation Agrees to Plead 
Guilty to Participating in Conspiracies to Rig Bids and Bribe Foreign Government Officials (Sept. 15, 
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/September/11-crm-1193.html. 
191 Press Release, New York State Dep’t of Fin. Services, NYDFS Announces Bank Of Tokyo 
Mitsubishi UFJ To Pay Additional $315 Million Penalty For Misleading Regulators, Individual Bank 
Employees Will Resign And Accept Bans (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/pr1411 
81.htm. 
192  Shinsaku Iwahara, supra note 135, at 6. 
193 “[T]orishimariyaku Jishin Ga Hōreijunshu To Iu Kanten Ni Tatta Kaishakeiei Wo Okonatta No Ka 
Ina Ka. ”  The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 3, 39. 
194 See KAZUSHI YOSHIHARA, supra note 152, at 160 (arguing that, because of the practical 
impossibility of being certain of all applicable laws, the prohibition on director violation of law should be 
read with an implicit negligence standard). 
195 The court might ask itself whether a reasonable director in the situation presented, attempting to 
obey all applicable laws, might have taken the same actions as the director in question.  This seems 
compatible with the standard currently in effect, providing for liability in the event of intentional or 
negligent violations of law.  KENJIRŌ EGASHIRA, supra note 75, at 428 n.1 (explaining the current standard 
for liability for violation of law under Company Law Article 355).   
196 For example, they submitted a fraudulent call report to the Federal Reserve Board.  See The 
Practical Effects of the Commercial Code Reform on Corporate Governance, supra note 56, at 19 
(Professor Kubori notes that providing an analogous fraudulent report to the Ministry of Finance in Japan 
would have been a crime, so it is hard to believe that the directors who were actively involved did not know 
that they were violating U.S. law.). 
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of loyalty “even if the fiduciary believes that the illegal activity will result in 
profits for the entity.”197  If, however, directors have no knowledge of 
illegality, and assuming that the business judgment rule would otherwise 
apply, even illegal acts will receive business judgment protection, at least if 
made in reliance on the advice of counsel reasonably selected.198  If reliance 
on counsel reasonably selected is a prerequisite for business judgment 
protection of illegal director activity, the Delaware rule may reflect simply 
the behind-the-scenes operation of a negligence standard largely consistent 
with the Japanese rule.  In other words, a showing of reliance on counsel 
may simply be a proxy for showing that the decision-making process 
involved due care, in which case the decision is only accorded business 
judgment protection after the director is able to demonstrate that the 
decision-making process was not negligent.199  This reading of the Delaware 
rule cannot be compared directly with the Daiwa opinion, because the Daiwa 
court did not explicitly state whether its refusal to apply the business 
judgment rule to directors’ illegal activities was due to procedural 
negligence on the part of the directors, though the court’s analysis implies 
that it found the directors did not act in good faith.200, 201 
 As long as some requirement of negligence or intentionality is 
present, a global application of the duty to obey foreign laws is more 
sensible from a policy perspective than what was the prevailing wisdom 
before the Daiwa case—namely that “directors who reside in Japan can not 
be held responsible for an incident that happened [in] a place so far away [as 
                                                
197 Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934-35 n.89 (Del. Ch. 2007) (quoting Metro Communication 
Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Technologies, Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 131 (Del. Ch. 2004)). 
198 Id. at 935; Litt v. Wycoff, No. 19083-NC, 2003 WL 1794724, at *7 n.42 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“There 
can be no personal liability of a director for losses arising from ‘illegal’ transactions if a director were 
financially disinterested, acted in good faith, and relied on advice of counsel reasonably selected in 
authorizing a transaction.”) (quoting Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., No. 14725, 1996 WL 422330, at *4 n. 
2  (Del. Ch. 1996), published in part, 683 A.2d 1049, 1051).  Delaware courts do not appear to have yet 
addressed an unintentional violation of law made in the non-oversight context.  The Seventh Circuit 
examined a board’s “failure to act in the face of known egregious violations of law” and noted that in such 
circumstances the directors may not receive business judgment protection.  Alan L. Dye, Postgraduate 
Course in Federal Securities Law: Current Developments, SL020 ALI-ABA 671, 683 (2005) (citing In re 
Abbott Laboratories Derivative Shareholders Litigation, 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
199 This reading represents burden-shifting rather than a standards-based change to the business 
judgment rule.  Under this formulation, upon a showing of illegal director behavior, the directors would 
bear responsibility for showing that the decision-making process was not negligent. 
200 The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 39 (Because the court examines whether directors acted 
“with a goal of complying with law,” presumably a finding of liability would indicate a lack of good faith, 
though the court does not state this explicitly.). 
201 Although there is not a definitive ruling on this issue, the basic principle under Japanese law 
seems to be that “unlawful acts” (hōreiihankōi) do not benefit from business judgment protection.  Hatsuru 
Morita, supra note 155, at 8. 
APRIL 2015 JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LAW   
 
 
353 
New York].”202  The idea that it is not within directors’ discretion to violate 
the law logically applies to foreign laws just as much as it does to domestic 
ones, and the necessity of damages in order to find liability means that 
directors will not be liable to the corporation for a violation of law which did 
not cause harm to the corporation. 203   The negligence or bad faith 
requirement should assuage concerns about holding directors liable for 
violating laws of which they could not reasonably be aware.204  Additionally, 
the Daiwa court specified that directors have a duty to obey the laws of 
foreign countries when the company expands its business into or establishes 
offices within those countries.  However, the court did not state that any and 
all foreign laws are necessarily within the ambit of Commercial Code 
Article 266, para. 1, no. 5.205  This leaves open the possibility that a 
director’s failure to obey certain foreign laws may not amount to 
negligence.206 
 The Daiwa court’s groundbreaking conclusion that directors are 
bound by Commercial Code Article 266 to obey the laws of foreign 
countries was thus eminently reasonable and also consistent with 
precedent. 207   Although there are no relevant Delaware cases for 
comparison, 208  the logical underpinnings of both the Japanese and the 
Delaware duty of directors to obey the law are entirely consistent with a 
definition that includes foreign laws.  Accordingly, the court’s reading of the 
scope of Commercial Code Article 266 is solid from both public policy and 
analytical standpoints.209 
 As the stakes for international compliance have increased for Japanese 
corporations, the standards set by the Osaka District Court in Daiwa have 
                                                
202 Mitsuru Misawa, supra note 29, at 1060-61. 
203 Company Law, art. 423, para 1 states that directors will be liable for damages resulting from a 
breach of duty and not simply for the breach of duty itself.  Kaishahō [Kaishahō] [Company Law], Law No. 
109 of 2006, art. 423, para 1 (Japan). 
204 Professors Kanda and Miyasako express these worries in The Practical Effects of the Commercial 
Code Reform on Corporate Governance, supra note 56, at 18–19. 
205 The Daiwa Bank Case, supra note 9, at 39. 
206 This seems to be consistent with current Japanese law on this topic.  See supra Part III.D.1. 
207 Prior to Daiwa, the most relevant opinion in this area was the Nomura Securities Loss 
Compensation Case, a Tokyo High Court ruling that held that the phrase “laws and regulations” includes 
the Commercial Code and all the laws that a company is supposed to obey in conducting its business. 
Mitsuru Misawa, Shareholders’ Action and Director’s Responsibility in Japan, supra note 63, at 29. 
208 Having practiced law in the United States and in Japan (as a foreign lawyer), this author’s 
impression is that the distinction between “foreign” and “domestic” corporate law is less meaningful in a 
country with fifty powerful state legislatures creating a network of rules that corporations must regularly 
address regardless of their home state of incorporation. 
209 Issues of causation and the source of director liability are potentially problematic aspects of this 
portion of the Daiwa opinion, but those are excluded for the sake of clarity in this analysis of the scope of 
Commercial Code art. 266, para. 1, no. 5.  Shinsaku Iwahara, supra note 29, at 4 n.1. 
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become increasingly important and are even easier to justify from a policy 
perspective.  With a large number of Japanese corporations operating 
overseas and enmeshed in a thick net of international regulation, competent 
oversight of compliance with foreign regulations has become a crucial part 
of many Japanese directors’ duties and a focus for legal practitioners.210  
Household names in Japan like Marubeni and Bridgestone Corporation211 
have found themselves on the receiving end of U.S. Department of Justice 
prosecution for alleged overseas bribery of government officials, and 
negligent failure to comply with international law is an entirely foreseeable 
risk that can result in real damage to shareholder value.  
 
E. Limitations on Director Liability: Japan’s Response to the Daiwa 
Bank Case and a Comparison to Delaware Law 
 
At the time of the Daiwa decision, the court’s enormous findings of 
director liability surely exacerbated the risk of deterring competent 
candidates for directorship.  The astonishing sums involved prompted one 
Japanese commentator to hyperbolically describe director liability of this 
magnitude as a human rights issue.212  Partially in response to the Daiwa 
case, the Japanese Diet wasted little time in enacting limitations on 
directors’ liability and allowing corporations to enter into limited liability 
contracts with directors.213  Outside directors can now enter into contracts to 
reduce their liability within limits specified by the corporation’s articles of 
incorporation under Company Law Article 427, except in cases of bad faith 
or gross negligence.214  This provision will be expanded to include non-
outside directors who are not executive officers by the amendments to the 
Company Law expected to take effect in 2015.215 
Company Law Arts. 425 and 426, para. 3 provide the general 
procedures for relieving a director of liability in a company that has not 
already amended its articles of incorporation to provide for limited director 
                                                
210 See, e.g., Mitsuru Chino, supra note 5, at 29; Kana Morimura, Beikokuhōjō No Karuteru Jian Ni 
Okeru Taiō Jitsumu [A Practical Response to Cartel Issues under U.S. Law], 2036 SHŌJI HŌMU 25 (2014). 
211 Bridgestone Corporation Agrees to Plead Guilty to Participating in Conspiracies to Rig Bids and 
Bribe Foreign Government Officials, supra note 190. 
212  Literally, an “issue connected to the defense of human rights” (“jinken wo yōgo suru koto ni mo 
tsunagaru”).  Tatsuo Uemura, Torishimariyaku Ga Taikaishasekinin Wo Ou Baai Ni Okeru Songaibaishō 
No Hani [The Scope of Damages for Directors Who Are Liable to Their Corporations], 1600 SHŌJI HŌMU 
4, 4 (2001). 
213 KIICHI GOTŌ, supra note 132, at 303. 
214 Id. at 306. 
215 The Proposal of the Bill to Amend a Portion of the Company Law and a Summary Thereof, supra 
note 1, at 6. 
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liability.  The procedure is quite complicated and involves several steps and 
qualifiers:  (1) the finding of liability must not be based on bad faith or gross 
negligence; (2) the directors must disclose during a shareholder meeting the 
reasons for limiting liability, the degree to which they wish to limit liability, 
and similar information, and they must receive consent through a special 
vote; (3) if the company uses internal auditors, the directors must obtain 
unanimous consent from the auditors, and if the company instead uses a 
committee system, the directors must obtain unanimous consent from the 
audit committee; (4) the directors must consider the particular facts and 
circumstances resulting in the director liability at issue, and if they 
determine that limitation of liability is necessary, they then may amend the 
company’s articles of incorporation to state that director liability may be 
reduced to some specific minimum; and (5) if a director vote rather than a 
shareholder vote has effectuated the reduction in liability (a resolution to 
limit director liability can be implemented through either a director vote or a 
shareholder vote), then directors must give shareholders up to one month to 
object. 216  If shareholders holding three percent or more of the shares of the 
company object, then the director’s liability will not be limited.217   
If the company’s articles of incorporation already provide for 
limitations on director liability, the directors must get unanimous consent of 
the auditors or the audit committee before voting on a resolution to limit a 
particular director’s liability.218  Liability may be limited to, but no lower 
than, the following amounts:  six times the annual compensation for a 
representative director; four times the annual compensation for a director, 
and two times the annual compensation for outside directors, auditors, 
accounting consultants, and account auditors.219, 220  The amendments to the 
Company Law to take effect in 2015 will bring this limit down to two times 
the annual compensation for non-outside directors who are not executive 
officers.221 
This framework for limiting liability has come under considerable 
criticism.  Because it calculates salaries before tax, its limitation of 
representative director liability, for example, to six years’ salary could in 
fact amount to ten years’ salary after taxes (depending on applicable tax 
                                                
216 KIICHI GOTŌ, supra note 132, at 304-05. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 305. 
219 Id. at 304. 
220 Stock options are included when the amount of annual salary is calculated.  The Practical Effects 
of the Commercial Code Reform on Corporate Governance, supra note 56, at 17. 
221 The Proposal of the Bill to Amend a Portion of the Company Law and a Summary Thereof, supra 
note 1, at 6. 
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rates).222  The reduction in the limit for non-outside directors included in the 
recent amendments to the Company Law was likely in part a reaction to this 
criticism.  Additionally, even though the liability limitations were enacted in 
part as a response to the Daiwa case, certain Daiwa directors who were 
found liable in the Second Case were also found to have acted intentionally, 
which would have pushed their activity beyond the purview of these liability 
limitations. 223   Initially, some Japanese scholars feared that subjecting 
amendments to the articles of incorporation to permit limitations on even 
outside director liability to shareholder vote would expose companies to 
reputational harm and shareholder criticism.224  However, several years later 
outside director limited liability contracts seemed to be functioning 
effectively.225  There also exists debate about whether it would be preferable 
to permit total elimination of outside director liability226 as in Delaware.227  
Notably, a company will face a difficult choice if it seeks a limitation on 
director liability after the commission of questionable director behavior but 
before a lawsuit has been lodged; seeking after-the-fact limitation of director 
liability may effectively force the company to admit simple negligence on 
the part of the director.228 
Delaware, on the other hand, allows corporations to do away with 
director liability in its entirety absent conflicts of interest, intentional 
misconduct, or a lack of good faith.229  This wholesale elimination of 
director liability in many circumstances is workable partially because of the 
credible threat that litigation poses in the United States to expose and 
embarrass directors who do a poor job of fulfilling their duties. 230  
Admittedly, an effective discovery system is necessary for threats of this 
type to be credible, and only in rare cases will plaintiffs in Japan be able to 
                                                
222 The Practical Effects of the Commercial Code Reform on Corporate Governance, supra note 56, 
at 17. 
223 Id. 
224 See, e.g., id. at 23; see also Ichirō Kawamoto, Daiwa Ginkō Kabunushi Daihyōsoshō No Wakai 
Wo Kataru [A Discussion on the Daiwa Bank Derivative Suit Settlement], 94 TORHISHIMARIYAKU NO 
HŌMU 4, 12-13 (2002) (not discussing outside directors specifically, but stating that companies may be 
effectively admitting director malfeasance if they attempt to vote into effect limitations on director 
liability). 
225 KIICHI GOTŌ, supra note 132, at 306-307. 
226 The Practical Effects of the Commercial Code Reform on Corporate Governance, supra note 56, 
at 24. 
227 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).  
228 Ichirō Kawamoto, supra note 224, at 12. 
229 Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Twenty Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom: An Essay on the Limits of 
Civil Liability of Directors and the Role of Shareholder Inspection Rights, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 283, 286 
(2006). 
230 Id. at 290 (noting that some of these cases involve a failure on the part of directors respond to “red 
flags” in monitoring their corporation). 
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“piggyback” their claims on discovery conducted as part of a criminal 
investigation, as did the plaintiffs in Daiwa.231  Without broad powers of 
discovery and with a liability standard of intentional misconduct or bad 
faith, potential plaintiffs in Japan would be able to find representation in 
only the most extraordinary circumstances.  Even the Daiwa Bank Case, 
which involved apparently intentional director misconduct and the largest 
criminal fine levied on a financial institution in U.S. history, was ultimately 
litigated not by a large firm but by a small-firm lawyer who found it difficult 
to eke out a living as the case dragged on.232 
Accordingly, adoption of Delaware-style rules permitting total 
elimination of director liability in most cases would not be suitable in 
Japan’s current litigation and corporate governance environment, even in 
light of Prime Minister Abe’s recent push for increased transparency.  On 
the other hand, it is hard to believe that current limitations on director 
liability are sufficient to fully mitigate the risk of deterring qualified 
candidates who seek to avoid courts second-guessing their business 
decisions and retroactively applying modern industry standards to evaluate 
business decisions from years past.  Yet there remain other means to that 
end, such as indemnification, liability insurance for directors, and reform of 
the Japanese business judgment rule.233  Thus, these limitations on director 
liability appear to be reasonable and apposite in light of Japan’s litigation 
system and corporate governance landscape. 
 
F. Causation and the Scope of Director Liability 
 
Issues of causation present a major problem in the Daiwa Bank Case.  
Professor Shinsaku Iwahara convincingly articulates this set of criticisms, 
noting contradictions in the courts’ reasoning.234  One issue arises from the 
fact that the criminal fine levied on Daiwa was part of plea bargain that 
encompassed certain illegal activity by Iguchi prior to his confession to 
                                                
231 Aronson, supra note 17, at 24. 
232 Ichirō Kawamoto, supra note 224, at 7. 
233 Indemnification and liability insurance in Japan are, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this 
article. 
234 Most, but not all, of Professor Iwahara’s arguments are addressed here.  Iwahara also argues, for 
example, that damages incurred through a criminal fine ultimately stemming from a failure to monitor may 
be special damages to which Minpō (Civil Code) art. 416, para. 2 applies rather than standard damages to 
which Civil Code art. 416, para. 1 applies.  A suit for special, rather than standard, damages will saddle 
plaintiffs with a more exacting foreseeability requirement.  A further exploration is beyond the scope of this 
article.  See Shinsaku Iwahara, supra note 29, at 9; MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.] art. 416 paras. 1–2 (Japan). 
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Daiwa’s president.235  Although the court only found one director liable for 
failing to implement and maintain an internal control system in the First 
Case, in the Second Case the court found that many directors were 
nonetheless liable for the criminal fines incurred.236  In other words, even 
though in the First Case the court found certain directors not liable for losses 
incurred by Iguchi’s trades, in the Second Case, the court found some of the 
same directors liable for other consequences of Iguchi’s clandestine activity. 
Furthermore, Professor Iwahara describes as dubious the court’s 
finding that the criminal penalties of this scale, which ultimately stemmed 
from directors’ failure to adequately maintain an internal control system, 
were sufficiently foreseeable for a finding of director liability.237  Iwahara 
argues that, given that this was a record-breaking fine, the court should have 
considered that a certain portion of the fine might not have been 
foreseeable.238  Iwahara also notes that the true measure of director liability 
in the Second Case is the degree to which the directors’ violations of law 
increased the fines levied on Daiwa over the fines that would have been 
levied on Daiwa had Iguchi’s activity been the sole violation of law at 
issue.239  This would accurately reflect the causal relationship between (1) 
certain defendant directors’ decision to cover up the losses through false 
reports and (2) the monetary harm suffered by Daiwa as a result of those 
decisions.  Iwahara would still have the plaintiff bear the burden of proof 
and the requirement of reasonable foreseeability would still apply.240 
Among the above criticisms, least convincing is the claim relating to 
foreseeability of the criminal fine.241  Iwahara correctly notes that directors 
who were not liable for Iguchi’s unauthorized trading losses due to a failure 
to monitor should not be liable for criminal fines incurred as a result of 
Iguchi’s illegal activity.242  Accordingly, the analysis should examine the 
extent to which the $340 million fine exceeds the fine that Daiwa would 
have faced absent the post-confession cover-up in the Second Case.243  Here, 
                                                
235 See Criminal Complaint & Indictment Against Daiwa Bank, supra note 14; Peter Truell, Daiwa 
Bank Admits Guilt In Cover-Up, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/29/busines 
s/daiwa-bank-admits-guilt-in-cover-up.html. 
236 Shinsaku Iwahara, supra note 29, at 8-9. 
237 Id. at 9. 
238 Id. at 9, 10 n.3 (stating that even though the fine was decided pursuant to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, the magnitude of the fine was extraordinary). 
239 Id. at 9-10. 
240 Id. at 10. 
241 Counsel for Daiwa Bank also made this claim, arguing on appeal (before settlement was reached) 
that “nobody could have foreseen the astronomical criminal fines” levied on Daiwa.  Ichirō Kawamoto, 
supra note 224, at 16. 
242 Shinsaku Iwahara, supra note 29, at 10. 
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Iwahara leaves open the possibility that the fine may have been 
unforeseeable even given the management-level criminality in the Second 
Case.244  However, in this portion of the analysis, certain directors making 
this claim would find themselves in the unenviable position of arguing that 
the fine was not a foreseeable consequence of a high-level corporate 
conspiracy to conceal from the U.S. regulatory authorities $1.1 billion in 
losses incurred through off-the-books securities trades—including (at least 
allegedly) the forgery of custodial receipts, destruction of evidence, and the 
submission of a fraudulent call report to the F.R.B. claiming $600 million in 
phantom assets—even though the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for 
up to $1.3 billion in fines for such violations of law.  That the Daiwa court 
did not thoroughly explore this line of reasoning does little to undermine the 
credibility of the court’s decision.  
Furthermore, although it is undeniably important to determine what 
amount of the fine was purely a reflection of Iguchi’s illegal activity, there 
was a “very good chance” that Daiwa would not have faced any criminal 
charges had it promptly reported Iguchi’s illegal actions.245  As a result, the 
decision to engage in a criminal cover-up may in fact have been the 
proximate cause of the criminal fine in its entirety.  Admittedly, the court’s 
analysis is unequivocally lacking with regard to these issues of foreseeability 
and causation.  However, it is not clear that these analytical lacunae had any 
effect on the outcome of the case, though the plaintiffs certainly would have 
faced a higher burden of proof had the court explored these issues. 
Professor Iwahara’s most potent arguments—namely that the liability 
analysis conflates discrete issues and that the court inconsistently found 
directors simultaneously liable and not liable for what was effectively the 
same activity—are extremely convincing.  Furthermore, Iwahara’s focus on 
consistency and clarity of analysis in applying complex foreign legal 
concepts is well placed.  Indeed, these are crucially important points for 
Japanese courts to consider as the web of international regulation in which 
companies operate becomes increasingly complex and some large Japanese 
corporations are finding themselves on the wrong end of criminal 
investigations by the U.S. government.246 
 
                                                
244 Id. 
245 Steven A. Miller, How Daiwa Self-Destructed, 113 BANKING L.J. 560, 574-75 (1996).  Miller is 
the former Chief of the Banking and Financial Institutions Fraud Unit of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 
Chicago.  Id. at 560 n.a. 
246 See supra Part III.D.3. 
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G. Criminality 
 
A final point for criticism in the Daiwa opinion is the court’s 
assumption of director criminality as a result of the bank’s plea agreement.  
The court held that the directors’ behavior forming the basis for the charges 
in the indictment was in violation of U.S. law but relied entirely on the plea 
agreement as proof of violation of U.S. law.247  In this context, issues of 
criminal culpability, business judgment, and international legal standards all 
converge.248  In the United States, plea agreements are extremely common 
and allow defendants to reduce the unpredictability of jury trials.249  Even 
though a corporation must plead guilty in a plea agreement, the guilty plea 
may well reflect a business judgment on the part of the directors to reduce 
corporate risk regardless of whether the corporation has committed clearly 
criminal acts.  These considerations provide a strong argument that plea 
agreements should not be taken as per se evidence of criminality. 
Refusing to recognize that directors in this situation may choose to 
enter into a plea bargain as a matter of business judgment may ultimately 
create a conflict of interest for certain directors.  If a director fears that any 
plea agreement she causes her corporation to enter into will be taken as per 
se evidence of corporate or director criminality in subsequent lawsuits, she 
may be incentivized to avoid plea bargaining even when it would be in the 
best interests of the corporation.  The muddled analysis of business 
judgment illegality under Commercial Code Article 266, para. 1, no. 5 in the 
Daiwa Bank Case is likely to exacerbate this by lumping in failure to prevent 
violations of law with actual violations of law and denying business 
judgment protection to even the directors who were not themselves shown to 
have violated or caused a violation of law.250 
Because Japan does not have a plea bargain system similar to that of 
the United States, this particular point of the Daiwa Bank Case has not been 
a major subject of debate.251  Nonetheless, as the United States further builds 
out its anti-bribery and anti-terrorist legal frameworks,252 this issue is likely 
to resurface in the near future.  A standard that recognizes the different plea 
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bargaining procedures and their potential impact on directors’ business 
judgments would be far preferable to the current standard and would allow 
for a better alignment of incentives to preserve shareholder value. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 With Japan’s current focus on corporate governance reform and the 
increasing degree to which Japanese corporations find themselves subject to 
foreign laws, the duties of corporate directors and the related issues raised in 
the Daiwa Bank Case are assuming even greater importance than in the past.  
Nonetheless, this article’s examination of some of the most influential and 
groundbreaking judicial analysis underpinning several tenets of modern 
Japanese corporate governance reveals that these tenets have not always 
been supported by perspicuous logic and may not be structured to achieve 
optimal outcomes.  The far-reaching influence of Daiwa has been oblique in 
some respects, particularly because the case was settled before the Osaka 
High Court could produce a decision on the appeal.  Even one of Daiwa 
Bank’s defense lawyers was disappointed that the case settled before a 
higher court had a chance to rule on some of the more intriguing questions 
raised by the Osaka District Court opinion.253  And yet even though the case 
has continued to be a subject of study for Japanese law students, it remains 
largely unexamined by American legal scholars, with a few exceptions.254 
 The case’s value stems as much from its analytical shortcomings as 
from its trailblazing interpretations and analytical successes.  Indeed, the 
court’s application of the business judgment rule and its examination of 
directors’ duty to establish an internal control system throw into stark relief 
the concerns animating the analogous Delaware rules and invite 
reconsideration of the relevant Japanese ones.  Similarly, the court’s analysis 
of causation, scope of liability, and criminality leave much to be desired and 
may serve as an example of mistakes to avoid in future cases, which are 
likely to arise sooner rather than later given the international environment in 
which Japanese companies operate today.  On the other hand, the court’s 
interpretation of the scope of “laws and regulations” as it appears in 
Commercial Code Article 266 and the Japanese Diet’s subsequent reforms 
(both following Daiwa and again in 2014) to allow limitations of director 
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liability are innovative and workable solutions to new problems confronting 
Japanese corporate governance in an era of inexorable globalization. 
 The impact of the Daiwa Bank Case as a milestone of evolving 
jurisprudence is undeniable, and it holds particular value as a focal point for 
corporate governance analysis and debate in a country with relatively little 
relevant case law.  The criticism of the Daiwa opinion from both Japanese 
academics and legal practitioners is evidence of the considerable intellectual 
resources that the Japanese legal community has devoted to questions of 
corporate governance, and that devotion encourages optimism in the 
ongoing process of Japanese corporate law reform, despite dispiriting 
developments such as the Olympus accounting scandal.  In serving as a 
springboard for discussion and reform of key corporate law principles, the 
Daiwa Bank Case represents a remarkable success that continues to pay 
dividends. 
